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Abstract 
 
Since the 1970s, almost every sector along the agrifood supply chain, such as production, 
processing, distribution, and retailing, has been characterized by increasing concentration, 
and this has raised concerns over the welfare of small farms and final consumers. For 
consumers, the significant external costs associated with unhealthy food consumption have 
also raised concerns about how to make people, especially those in low-income households, 
eat healthier. This dissertation explores two key issues in the U.S. agrifood sector: the 
changing market structure and the impact of public policies on consumers’ healthy eating 
behavior.  
The first essay develops a model of firm behavior to generate testable predictions of 
how concentration in upstream agricultural production affects industrial concentration in 
the downstream food manufacturing sector. It then uses three independent identification 
strategies to quantify the causal effect of agricultural production concentration, using 
commuting zone-level data from the 1982 to 2012 Censuses of Agriculture. The first 
strategy uses weather-induced variation of agricultural concentration, the second strategy
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uses the variation of agricultural concentration caused by government payment programs, 
and the last strategy exploits a policy change that made oilseed eligible for government 
payments. I find that a more concentrated agricultural production sector leads to a 
significantly more concentrated food manufacturing sector: at the sample means, a 2.5% 
increase of the HHI of agricultural production leads to a 0.7% increase of the HHI of food 
manufacturing. 
The second essay (coauthored with Zhenshan Chen) investigates the impact of the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) on low-income households’ diet 
quality. Based on data from the National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey 
(FoodAPS), we find that SNAP does not affect diet quality. The mechanisms through 
which the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) affects diet quality are 
poorly understood. We develop a theoretical model that generates two effects of SNAP on 
diet quality: 1) a mental accounting effect, when households use SNAP benefits differently 
from cash income, and 2) a households healthy eating awareness effect throughout the 
SNAP benefit cycle. We find no evidence for the mental accounting effect that induces 
participants to treat SNAP benefits as healthy food money. However, the analysis validates 
a diet quality cycle in the sense that participants’ healthy eating awareness declines 
throughout the SNAP benefit month.  
The third essay (coauthored with Rigoberto Lopez and Rebecca Boehm) investigates 
the impact of Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on beverage 
choices by low-income households. We utilize household-level data on beverage purchases 
from 2013 to 2016 in 52 U.S. metropolitan areas in Medicaid expansion and non-expansion 
states. Results from a triple-differences model, with nearly one million observations on 
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purchases of seven beverage categories, indicate that Medicaid expansion resulted in 
eligible households buying more soda and fruit drinks and less bottled water. Results from 
a mixed-logit model, with nearly 17 million purchase observations at the household-brand 
level, indicate that Medicaid expansion led to overall increases in eligible households’ 
purchases of and valuation of sugary beverages and a decrease in their price elasticities of 
demand. The unintended impacts found in these empirical results highlight the need to 
complement the benefits of Medicaid expansion with effective diet quality programs or to 
investigate nudges to improve the healthfulness of low-income household beverage choices. 
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Chapter 1 
Upstream and Downstream Concentration in the U.S. Agri-food 
Industries 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the 1970s, almost every sector along the agricultural and food supply chain — 
production, manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing — has become more concentrated 
(Olliger et al., 2005).1 This partly reflects economy-wide trends: more than 75% of the U.S. 
industries have experienced an increase in concentration levels over the last three decades 
(Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely, 2017). The growing concentration across all stages in the 
agri-food supply chain has raised concerns about double marginalization, which has been 
partially addressed by the growing use of contracts and increasing vertical integration 
between successive layers in this supply chain (Sexton, 2012). 
While many empirical studies of the concentration in the agricultural and food markets 
have focused on the effects of concentration on market efficiency and market distortion 
(Rogers and Sexton, 1994; Björnerstedt and Stennek, 2007; Inderst and Shaffer, 2009), the 
potential spillover effect of concentration across connected sectors has been largely ignored 
even though it is likely to be particularly relevant in the modern U.S. agricultural and food 
 
1 From 1950 to 2016, the number of active farm operations declined from 5.64 to 2.06 million while the 
average farm size increased from 212.83 to 442.23 acres (NASS, 2018). From 1987 to 2012, the share of 
output by farms with sales more than $5,000,000 increased from 19.2% to 31.7% (MacDonald, Hoppe, and 
Newton, 2018). From 1997 to 2012, the market share of top 50 food wholesalers increased from 44% to 57% 
and the market share of top 50 food retailers increased from 54% to 61% (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2018). 
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markets. Because various stages are becoming increasingly vertically integrated, it’s 
possible that a sector’s incentive to consolidation comes from consolidation in connected 
industries that sell intermediate inputs necessary to production. For example, when 
upstream farms increase their market power by differentiating their products or joining in 
cooperatives, the downstream food manufacturing firms have at least two incentives for 
horizontal expansion. First, firms could increase bargaining power and drive down prices 
of intermediate inputs via a horizontal expansion. Second, firms could take advantage of 
economies of scale to reduce costs via a horizontal expansion. 
While the agricultural producers are always depicted as price-takers and are suffering 
from the seller power of agricultural input suppliers and the buyer power of downstream 
buyers, the farming sector is actually transforming from a competitive to a non-competitive 
market. Specifically, farms are increasingly characterized by higher consolidation and 
product differentiation, especially in some sectors like local produce, organic produce, or 
dairy products where farms differentiate their products by joining cooperatives. Given the 
vast studies that documented the increasing consolidation of growers, it’s surprising that 
no studies have ever tested if big farms have bargaining power and whether a more 
concentrated farm sector can affect the concentration structure of the downstream sectors.  
Understanding how structural changes spread from production to other stages of the 
supply chain is critical in fully understanding the effects of agricultural policies that 
contribute to the growing consolidation in the farm sector. If consolidation in the 
agricultural production sector affects the consolidation process in the downstream food 
manufacturing sector, then we should take into account both the direct effects of 
agricultural policies on the agricultural sector and the indirect effects on other agricultural-
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related sectors, including both the distortion effects caused by market power and  efficiency 
gains due to economies of scale, to have a more comprehensive policy evaluation. 
This article focuses on the influence of upstream concentration on concentration 
outcomes in the downstream food manufacturing sector. To my knowledge, little research 
has theoretically investigated this and no empirical papers have looked at this so far. This 
article first develops a model that generates predictions of how agricultural concentration 
affects the concentration in the food manufacturing sector via the intermediate input 
markets and then quantifies the causal effect using the US commuting zone-level data from 
the seven Censuses of Agriculture from 1982 to 2012.  
The theory predicts that whether a more concentrated upstream sectors leads to a more 
concentrated or a more competitive downstream sector depends critically the price 
elasticity of demand food firms face in their downstream market. Specifically, if the 
demand is inelastic (elastic), then a more concentrated farm sector leads to a more 
concentrated (competitive) downstream food manufacturing sector. 
Empirically, there are several challenges in quantifying the causal impact of 
concentration in agricultural production on downstream concentration. First, how to define 
market boundaries and concentration? Defining the market boundaries is not an easy task 
and the market definition varies across agricultural commodities because the extent to 
which farm production is shipped short vs. long distances varies greatly by commodities. 
We use commuting-zone (CZ) as the market boundaries and use Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) to measure concentration. Second, estimation of the true causal relationships 
must overcome the potential for reverse causality (a concern that concentration in food 
manufacturing can affect farm entry and exit) and unobserved factors that influence 
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concentration in both sectors. A related issue is the potential endogeneity of agricultural 
productivity. Because agricultural concentration and productivity are closely correlated 
(Huffman and Evernson, 2001; Adamopoulos and Restuccia, 2014; Luttmer, 2007), any 
instrument proposed to deal with the endogeneity of agricultural concentration would affect 
concentration in food manufacturing sector through agricultural productivity, making it 
difficult to isolate the impact of concentration from that of agricultural productivity on the 
food manufacturing sector. 
To address these identification challenges, this article uses three independent 
identification strategies. The first strategy utilizes agricultural concentration changes 
induced by weather shocks and relies on the assumption that weather variation directly 
affects farm profitability and concentration and is exogenous to the food manufacturing 
sector conditional on baseline controls. The second strategy uses time variation in the 
payment rates of commodity support programs, which are predetermined and independent 
of quantity and price and cross-sectional variation in a CZ’s acreage of commodity crops. 
Identification relies on the assumption that the government payment rate is exogenous and 
that government payments only affect food manufacturing via farms’ production and 
consolidation (Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins, 2003). The third strategy takes advantage of 
the quasi-natural experiment of oilseed production becoming eligible for government 
payments after the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill. Specifically, I compare concentration 
changes in oilseed manufacturing with concentration changes in other food manufacturing 
industries. This strategy is similar to a Difference-In-Difference (DID) strategy and relies 
on the assumption that the trend of concentration in the oilseed industry is the same as that 
in control industries before 1996. 
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To deal with the potential endogeneity of agricultural productivity, I bound the true 
effect based on estimates with and without agricultural productivity as a control. 
Specifically, depending on whether the instrument variable affects productivity and 
concentration in the same direction, and whether the instrument affects concentration more 
than productivity, the estimate with and without agricultural productivity as a control can 
be either an upper or a lower bound of the true effect with several assumptions about the 
exogeneity of the instrument (Leamer 1981; Dunn 2012). 
Based on the three independent strategies, I find that a one-percentage-point increase in 
the HHI of the farm sector increases the HHI of the food manufacturing sector by at least 
0.500 percentage points. This indicates that, at the sample means, a 2.5% increase of the 
HHI of farm sector increases the HHI of the food manufacturing sector by 0.7%. This 
finding is robust to the dynamic impact of agricultural concentration and the spillover 
effects of agriculture in neighboring commuting zones. Moreover, mechanism tests using 
macro-level data give evidence that a more concentrated farm sector increases the farm-
gate agricultural prices and thereby increasing the concentration of the food manufacturing 
sector. 
This article contributes to the literature on how farm productivity growth in the farm 
sector affects non-farm sectors (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Santangelo, 2016; Bustos, 
Caprenettini, and Ponticelli, 2016; Fiszbein, 2017) by documenting that, other than 
productivity, concentration change in the farm sector also begets concentration change in 
non-farm sectors. This article also contributes to the literature on causes of concentration 
by showing that structural change in one sector can cause concentration in other connected 
sectors. More importantly, this article takes a step toward the goal of understanding if 
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concentration change has a ripple effect in that it can spread across sectors. Future studies 
can test if the causal relationship identified here applies to other sectors and explore the 
underlying mechanisms using micro-level data. 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 lays out the empirical model and identification 
strategies, followed by the empirical results in Section 5 and additional robustness checks 
in Section 6. The last section concludes and discusses directions for future research. 
1.2 A Theoretical Model 
Although the relation between concentration levels in upstream agricultural production and 
downstream food manufacturing is bilateral, this model focuses on how concentration in 
the production sector affects that in the manufacturing sector.2 Different from previous 
studies that assume farmers are price takers, we assume farmers are oligopolists that have 
market power to reflect the growing trend that farmers are differentiating their products 
and/or joining cooperatives to increase pricing power. 
This section first develops and solves a model of a three-stage game between farms and 
food manufacturers in which the number of farms is exogenous and the number of 
downstream firms is determined by an entry condition defined by sunk cost F, and then 
uses the equilibrium to generate predictions of how entry and exit in the upstream farm 
sector affects the concentration in food manufacturing in the long run.  
 
2 Mérel and Sexton (2017) investigated the relationship in the reverse direction and found that a more 
concentrated food manufacturing sector induces more entry into the farming sector. 
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1.2.1 Model setup 
Consider an economy with 𝑀 ≥ 1 farms and 𝑁 ≥ 1 food manufacturers. The number of 
farms 𝑀 is exogenously given, and the number of food manufacturers 𝑁 is endogenous. 
The two sectors are linked by an intermediate input market in which each food 
manufacturer buys raw agricultural commodities from farms using labor and one unit of 
farm product input to produce one unit of output (fixed proportion production technology), 
and then sells processed products to its downstream buyers. Food manufacturers have two 
variable costs: the intermediate input and labor.3 In the interest of simplicity, all farms are 
identical, all manufacturers are identical, and the number of farms (food manufacturers) 
determines the market concentration in agricultural production (food manufacturing).4  The 
timeline of the model is as follows: 
(1) In the first stage, food manufacturers decide to enter or exit the market based on a 
free-entry condition defined by a sunk cost F, and this free-entry process determines the 
number of firms 𝑁 in the equilibrium.  
(2) In the second stage, given 𝑀 and 𝑁, farms compete with each other in quantities to 
determine the total quantity 𝑄𝑀 sold to food manufacturers at price 𝑃1(𝑄𝑀).  
(3) In the third stage, food manufacturers buy intermediate inputs from farms at the 
predetermined price 𝑃1 and compete in a Cournot fashion with an inverse market demand 
𝑃2(𝑄𝑁) in their downstream market. 
 
3 Adding a constant per-unit cost for other inputs does not change the essence of the model. I omit capital 
from the model for simplicity and assume technology remains constant. 
4 The assumption that farms (manufacturers) are identical makes the model simple without changing the 
economic motivation of the interaction between market concentration of the two sectors. 
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1.2.2 Market equilibrium 
I use backward induction to solve 𝑁(𝑀), 𝑄(𝑀, 𝑁), 𝑃1(𝑄) and 𝑃2(𝑄) in market equilibrium. 
I first derive the first-order condition in the third stage in which food manufacturers 
compete, then derive the first-order condition in the second stage in which farms compete, 
then present food manufacturers’ decisions as to enter or exit the market, and lastly solve 
for the equilibrium by imposing market clearing conditions. 
• Food manufacturer competition 
In the third stage, a food manufacturer 𝑛 seeks to maximize its profit by choosing 𝑞𝑛 given 
the price it faces for upstream inputs 𝑃1: 
𝜋𝑛 = 𝑃2(𝑞𝑛 + 𝑞−𝑛)𝑞𝑛 − 𝑤𝑞𝑛 − 𝑃1𝑞𝑛.                                                          (1) 
where  𝑞−𝑛  is the total quantity produced by food manufacturers other than 𝑛 ,  
𝑃2(𝑞𝑛 + 𝑞−𝑛) denotes the price food manufacturers receive for their products, 𝑤 denotes 
unit labor cost and is assumed to be constant (Food processing sector accounts for a small 
share of labor employment in a given area, and the type of labor employed in a food-
manufacturing plant would typically be mobile, so even where food processing was a large 
employer, the supply of labor facing a given employer would be very elastic). 5 
𝑃2(𝑞𝑛 + 𝑞−𝑛) is endogenous, while 𝑃1 is fixed in the third stage. The first-order condition 
with respect to 𝑞𝑛  is:  
𝜕𝜋𝑛
𝜕𝑞𝑛
= 𝑃2(𝑞𝑛 + 𝑞−𝑛) +
𝜕𝑃2
𝜕𝑞𝑛
𝑞𝑛 − 𝑤 − 𝑃1 = 0.  With symmetric 
competition, 𝑄𝑁 = 𝑁𝑞𝑛, the first-order condition that defines the symmetric equilibrium 
is: 
𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄𝑁) = 𝑃1 + 𝑤,                                                                                       (2) 
 
5 The assumption that unit labor cost is fixed can be relaxed to test how concentration affects wage structure 
in other industries, which has been discussed by Haworth and Reuther (1978), and Dorn et al. (2017). 
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where 𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄𝑁) = 𝑃2(𝑄𝑁) +
𝑄𝑁
𝑁
𝑃2
′(𝑄𝑁)  is the marginal revenue of a single 
manufacturer if the farm input equals 𝑄𝑁 . 6 To ensure the existence of equilibrium, the 
following two assumptions on the second-order conditions for each food manufacturer 
should be satisfied:  
𝜕2𝜋𝑛
𝜕𝑞𝑛2
< 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋𝑛
𝜕𝑞𝑛2
+ ∑ |
𝜕2𝜋𝑛
𝜕𝑞𝑛𝜕𝑞𝑖
|𝑖≠𝑛 < 0.                                                         (3) 
𝜕2𝜋𝑛
𝜕𝑞𝑛2
+ ∑ |
𝜕2𝜋𝑛
𝜕𝑞𝑛𝜕𝑞𝑖
|𝑖≠𝑛  implies that the derivative of 𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄𝑁)  with respect to 
𝑄𝑁 , 𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑁 < 0. 
• Farm competition 
In the second stage, a farm 𝑚 competes over quantities to maximize its profit, given a fixed 
unit production cost c and the derived demand function 𝑃1(𝑞𝑚, 𝑞−𝑚)  generated from 
equation (2) is: 
𝜋𝑚 = (𝑃1(𝑞𝑚, 𝑞−𝑚) − 𝑐)𝑞𝑚.                                                                        (4) 
With symmetric competition, 𝑞𝑚 =
𝑄𝑀
𝑀
. The market-wide first-order condition is: 
 𝑃1(𝑄𝑀) +
𝑄𝑀
𝑀
𝑃1
′(𝑄𝑀) = 𝑐,                                                                            (5) 
Different from previous models that assume 𝑃1
′(𝑄𝑀) = 0,  we assume 𝑃1
′(𝑄𝑀) ≠ 0  to 
reflect the pricing ability farms have in some sectors and to reflect the increasing 
consolidation occurring in the farm market. As mentioned earlier, farms are modeled as 
Cournot oligopolists rather than price takers to reflect the growing consolidation and 
product differentiation in the farm sector. 
 
6 I use 𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄𝑁) rather than 𝑀𝑅(𝑄𝑁) because this is the first-order condition in an oligopoly rather than a 
monopoly setting. 
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• The entry and exit of food manufacturers 
Given 𝑀  and an entry cost 𝐹 , the number of food manufacturers 𝑁  in equilibrium is 
determined by: 
𝜋(𝑀, 𝑁) = (𝑃2(𝑄) − 𝑃1(𝑄) − 𝑤)
𝑄
𝑁
= 𝐹,                                                     (6) 
where 𝑄 = 𝑄(𝑀, 𝑁) is the total quantity food manufacturers produce in equilibrium. The 
arguments in 𝑄 are suppressed to make notations less cumbersome.  
In equilibrium, 𝑄 = 𝑄𝑀 = 𝑄𝑁, 𝑃1(𝑄𝑀) in equation (5) equals 𝑃1 in equation (2), and 
𝑃2, 𝑃1, 𝑁 depends on 𝑀. The market equilibrium is determined by combining first-order 
conditions in (2) and (5): 
𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄) +
𝑄
𝑀
𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄 = 𝑐,                                                                             (7) 
where 𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄 is the derivative of 𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄) with respect to total quantity 𝑄. 
1.2.3 Comparative statics 
Total differentiating the equilibrium condition in equation (7) with respect to 𝑀 gives: 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑀
=
𝑄
𝑀2
1+
1
𝑀
(1+
𝑄𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑄
𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄
)
,                                                                                     (8) 
where 𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑄 is the second-derivative of 𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄)with respect to total quantity 𝑄. Total 
differentiating the first-order conditions in equations (2) with respect to 𝑀 gives: 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑀
=
1
𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄
(
𝑑𝑃1
𝑑𝑀
).  As mentioned in section 2.2.1, to ensure the existence of equilibrium in 
equation (2), 𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄 = 𝑃1
′(𝑄) < 0. Therefore, 
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑀
 and 
𝑑𝑃1
𝑑𝑀
 move in opposite directions. 
To ensure the existence of equilibrium defined by equation (7), the derivative of 
𝑀𝑅𝑁(𝑄) +
𝑄
𝑀
𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄 should be decreasing with respect to Q. Therefore, (1 +
1
𝑀
) 𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄 +
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𝑄
𝑀
𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑄 < 0 , 
𝑄𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑄
𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄
> −(1 + 𝑀)  𝑎𝑛𝑑 1 +
1
𝑀
(1 +
𝑄𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄𝑄
𝑀𝑅𝑁𝑄
) > 0.  Equation (8) 
indicates that an increase in the number of farms always decreases equilibrium farm price 
and increases farm output, which is intuitive in that when the number of farms increases, 
the farm sector is more competitive, and, therefore, the farm product price decreases and 
the farm output increases. 
As is known that in symmetric condition, the HHI can be denoted as : 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑁 =
1
𝑁
, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑀 =
1
𝑀
. To conduct the comparative analysis, I rewrite equation (6) as: 
f (𝑀, 𝑁) =(𝑃2(𝑄) − 𝑃1(𝑄) − 𝑤)
𝑄
𝑁
− 𝐹                                                     (9) 
Applying the implicit function theorem to (9), we get the following comparative statics: 
𝜕𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑁
𝜕𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑀
=
𝜕𝑀
𝜕𝑁
= −
𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑁⁄
𝜕𝑓 𝜕𝑀⁄
=
(𝑃2(𝑄)−𝑃1(𝑄)−𝑤)𝑄
𝑁
𝜕[(𝑃2(𝑄)−𝑃1(𝑄)−𝑤)𝑄]
𝜕𝑀
                                             (10)   
With the assumption of constant price elasticity of demand for processed products, we 
get (see Appendix A.2 for details): 
𝜕𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑁
𝜕𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑀
=
1
1+𝜀
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
𝑄
𝑁
                                                                                        (11) 
Because 
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
𝑄
𝑁
> 0,  it’s the price elasticity of demand for processed products that 
determines how the concentration in the food manufacturing responds to the concentration 
in agricultural production. 
A theoretical prediction about how concentration in agricultural production affects 
concentration in the food manufacturing sector is summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition: When the price elasticity of demand 𝜀 for processed products is constant, 
whether a more concentrated agricultural production sector leads to a more or less 
concentrated food manufacturing sector depends on the magnitude of 𝜀. If  −1 < 𝜀 <  0, 
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a more concentrated farm sector leads to a more concentrated food manufacturing sector. 
If 𝜀 < −1,  a more concentrated farm sector leads to a more competitive food 
manufacturing sector. 
The intuition behind the proposition is that when there are more farms, the intermediate 
input cost of food manufacturers would be lower, thereby increasing food manufacturers’ 
profits and inducing more entry. On the other hand, an increase in the number of farms 
would increase the total output, which would reduce the final price food manufacturers 
receive, thereby reducing profit and deterring entry. As a result, whether there will be more 
or fewer farms is uncertain and depends on the relative magnitude of the decreases in input 
cost and final price, which is similar to cost pass-through rate that measures the extent the 
input cost reduction can be passed to the final consumers (under imperfect competition, the 
curvature of demand is central to the rate of pass-through (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013)). 
Specifically, if the price elasticity of demand is inelastic, then the cost reduction cannot be 
largely passed through to downstream buyers, and a more competitive upstream sector 
leads to a more competitive downstream sector. On the other hand, if the price elasticity of 
demand is elastic, then the cost reduction can be largely passed on to downstream buyers, 
and a more competitive upstream sector leads to a more concentrated downstream sector. 
A welfare implication of the Proposition is that when the demand for processed products 
is elastic and the cost reduction can be largely passed to downstream buyers, greater 
competition in the agricultural sector benefits final consumers in the sense that consumers 
benefit more from the input cost reduction. While if the demand for processed product is 
inelastic, then the cost reduction resulted from the greater upstream competition cannot be 
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passed to downstream buyers, and food firms, rather than consumers, benefit more from 
the input cost reduction. 
1.2.4 Contribution of the theory 
Most of the current theoretical literature on bilaterally oligopolistic industries have focused 
on the impact of downstream concentration on input price and welfare via countervailing 
power. Dobson and Waterson (1997) developed a model where imperfectly competitive 
retailers negotiate intermediate prices with a monopoly supplier. Symeonidis (2008) 
analyzed the effects of downstream competition when there is bargaining between 
downstream firms and upstream agents (firms or unions). Thanassoulis (2009) used 
empirical evidence and explained why upstream competition can yield stronger buyer 
power than upstream monopoly. Iozzi and Valletti (2014) tested the impact of upstream 
suppliers’ outside option on input prices and welfare. Some studies have also investigated 
how vertical integration affects price and quantity when firms exert market power upstream 
and compete in quantities downstream (Loertscher and Reisinger, 2014). Gaudin (2017) 
investigated the effects of changes in market concentration on the equilibrium prices in a 
supply chain and found that whether countervailing buyer power arises depends on the 
pass-through rate of input prices to retail prices.  
Different from previous studies that investigated how downstream structure affects the 
countervailing buyer power and input price, this essay develops a model to test how 
upstream concentration affects downstream concentration when agents in both sectors play 
in a Cournot fashion. This theory complements the theory of Mérel and Sexton (2018) that 
investigated how downstream concentration affects upstream concentration and 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence that how upstream concentration affects 
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downstream concentration depends critically on the price elasticity of demand of 
downstream firms. 
1.3 Data Sources 
One of the defining attributes of U.S. agriculture is the heterogeneity across markets in 
terms of both products and geographies and the empirical tests of the Proposition should 
be conducted at the disaggregate agricultural commodity level. After collecting production 
and manufacturing data from the Agricultural Census and County Business Patterns, I use 
commuting-zone (CZ) as the market boundaries and map county-level data onto 
commuting-zone level data using the definition of commuting-zone developed by USDA 
in 2000. 
1.3.1 Agricultural production 
This article uses seven U.S. Censuses of Agriculture from 1982 to 2012 digitalized by 
Haines, Fishback, and Rhode (2018). The Census of Agriculture is the only source of 
uniform, comprehensive, and impartial county-level agricultural statistics, and it is 
currently administered by USDA to provide a complete picture of farms and ranches with 
more than $1000 raised or sold.  
I calculated the HHI index for different agricultural commodities at the CZ level based 
on group data on the number of farms in different size categories.7 Suppose farms are 
classified into 𝐾 categories based on their production value 𝑥𝑖  (𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝐾) , and 𝑥𝑖 <
𝑥𝑖−1.  If the share of farms in size category 𝑥𝑖 is 𝑓(𝑥𝑖), then the HHI is expressed as: 
 
7 The term “indexes of concentration” has been structured to measure distinct characteristics of the industrial 
structure. Different measures emphasize different aspects of the structure, and there exists no best 
measurement of concentration in general (Rosenbluth, 1955; Hall and Tideman, 1967). 
 15 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑ 𝑓(𝑥𝑖)
2𝑁
𝑖=1 .                                                    (12) 
HHI ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher HHI indicates a more concentrated farm production 
sector. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of HHI of agricultural production in 1982, 1992, 2002 
and 2012. There is a clear trend that agricultural concentration has increased over census 
years. 
1.3.2 Food manufacturing 
Data on food manufacturing come from the County Business Patterns (CBP) compiled by 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2018). Industries in the food manufacturing sector (NAICS 
code 311 and 312) transform livestock and agricultural products into products for 
intermediate or final consumption. Food products manufactured in these establishments are 
typically sold to wholesalers or retailers for distribution to consumers, and there are 56 
industries at the six-digit NAICS code level.8 
CBP provides information about annual payroll, total employment, and the number of 
establishments by employment size bins at the two to six-digit NAICS code levels from 
payroll tax filings.9 I use CBP data to calculate the HHI of food manufacturing sector. 
I compare the constructed HHI with HHI data reported by the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
in 2007 to check the validity of constructed HHI. The first test finds a rank correlation of 
0.70 between the constructed HHI and HHI for all three-digit manufacturing industries at 
the national level. The second test finds a rank correlation of 0.55 between constructed HHI 
 
8 See https://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/sssd/naics/naicsrch?chart_code=31&search=2002%20NAICS%20Search for a list of industries in the 
food manufacturing sector. 
9 CBP data before 1992 have 10 establishment size categories, and data after 1992 have 12 categories. 
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and HHI for all six-digit manufacturing industries at the national level, indicating the 
constructed HHI is a good indicator of local market concentration. 
1.3.3 Matching upstream agricultural production with downstream food 
manufacturing sector 
To conduct analysis at the disaggregate agricultural product level, I link the food 
processing sector with its corresponding upstream agricultural commodities based on the 
Input-Output table of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),10 I calculate the corresponding 
upstream concentration, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡, for each food processing industry 𝑗 in CZ 𝑖 by taking the 
value-weighted average of the HHI of agricultural commodities used in industry 𝑗: 
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑐𝑗𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑐𝑡.𝑐∈𝐼𝑗                                                     (13) 
where 𝛼𝑐𝑗  is the share of commodity 𝑐 in industry j’s total agricultural inputs obtained 
from the IO table. For example, the wet corn milling industry (NAICS 311221) obtains 
93.38% of its agricultural input from grain farming (111140, 111150, 111160, and 111190) 
and obtains 6.61% of its agricultural input from oilseed farming (111110, 111120, and 
111130). Therefore, I construct the concentration for the upstream sector of NAICS 311221 
by taking the weighted average of the concentration of grain farming and oilseed farming. 
1.3.4 Weather 
There are four types of weather data available: ground station, gridded, satellite, and 
reanalysis data, among which gridded data are used most frequently because they take the 
issues of missing station data, elevation, and the urban heat island into account (Dell, Jones, 
and Olken, 2014). I collected daily average temperature and precipitation at 4km by 4km 
 
10 See https://www.bea.gov/industry/io_annual.htm for details. 
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grid cell level from the Parameter-Elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model 
(PRISM) Climate Group at Oregon State University (2018) and calculated the area-
weighted averages of temperature and precipitation for all grid cells within a CZ to obtain 
CZ-level weather measurements.  
I use the cumulative precipitation and growing degree-days during the growing season, 
April 1 to September 30, to capture the impact of weather on agricultural production and 
concentration (Schlenker and Roberts, 2009). 11  Growing degree-days can capture the 
nonlinearity of the temperature-yield relationship (Schlenker, Hanemann, and Fisher, 2006; 
Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007). A day with a mean temperature below 46.4oF equals 
zero degree-days. A day with a mean temperature between 46.4oF and 89.6oF equals the 
number of degrees above 46.4 degree-days, and a day with a mean temperature above 
89.6oF equals 43.2 degree-days. 
1.3.5  Other data sources 
I collect data on government commodity payments from the Farm Income and Wealth 
Statistics at USDA ERS (2018) and collect additional demographic variables from the 
regional accounts at the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2018). 
After matching the HHI of food manufacturing sectors with the corresponding HHI of 
their upstream agricultural commodities at the CZ-level and dropping observations either 
without farms or without food manufacturers (less than 1% of total observations), the 
sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 41,720 observations covering 682 CZs and 53 
food manufacturing sectors over seven census years from 1982 to 2012. 
 
11 A concern of using growing degree-days is that the planting and harvest dates of different crops vary 
greatly. One solution is to obtain state-level planting and harvest dates for each crop from the USDA and 
generate the growing degree-days for each crop separately. 
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Columns (1) - (3) in Table 1 present descriptive statistics for the full sample, 1982, and 
2012. From 1982 to 2012, the HHI of agricultural production increases from 0.264 to 0.509, 
and the HHI of food manufacturing increases from 0.734 to 0.753. Panel C shows that 
precipitation levels decrease while growing degree-days increase substantially from 1982 
to 2012, and the value of government commodity payments fluctuate from 1982 to 2012. 
The variation in agricultural concentration over time provides identification to test if 
concentration change spreads from agricultural production to the food manufacturing 
sector. 
1.4 Empirical Strategy 
1.4.1 Baseline model 
The basic model used to explore the impact of agricultural concentration on the 
concentration in food manufacturing is: 
𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑍𝑖 +  𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,    (14) 
where 𝑖 denotes CZ, 𝑗 denotes sector and 𝑡 denotes year. 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the HHI of 
downstream food manufacturing sector 𝑗. 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the HHI of the upstream agricultural 
production. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the agricultural production value per farm in sector 𝑗.
12 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
set of time-variant CZ-level controls, including irrigation rate, median household income, 
and total population. I also include 𝐶𝑍𝑖, a commuting zone fixed effect that captures time-
invariant characteristics of CZs, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 , a sector fixed effects that capture sector-specific 
 
12 The production value is deflated by the agricultural price index farms receive. 
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characteristics, and 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡, a state-by-year fixed effect that captures systematic state 
differences over time. 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an error term. 
The coefficient of interest is α1 . A positive (negative) α1  indicates that a more 
concentrated agricultural production sector leads to a more concentrated (competitive) food 
manufacturing sector. There are two challenges in getting an unbiased estimate of α1: the 
endogeneity of 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 and the potential endogeneity of 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡. I address the endogeneity 
of 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 with three independent strategies and deal with the potential endogeneity of 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 using bounding techniques. 
1.4.2 Strategy 1: Weather as an instrument 
Because weather is clearly related to agricultural production and has no direct effect on the 
food manufacturing sector, I use both current and last year’s precipitation and growing 
degree-days as the instrument, as specified in the first stage: 
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
2 +
𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑍𝑖 + 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, (15) 
where 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 denotes the annual precipitation (in 1000mm). 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
2  is included to capture 
the nonlinear impact of precipitation. 𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑡  denotes growing degree days. 
𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
2 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 denotes weather conditions last year. Other notations 
have the same meanings as in equation (14). 
The rationale for using weather as the instrument relies on the validity assumption that 
weather only affects the food manufacturing sector via agricultural concentration, which 
might be violated if weather affects the manufacturing sector via 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡. This violation is 
discussed in Section 4.5. Under this strategy, the 2SLS estimate of 𝛼1 captures the local 
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average treatment effect (LATE) for compliers, defined as agricultural sectors whose 
concentration changes with weather shocks (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996). 
1.4.3 Strategy 2: Commodity program payments as an instrument 
U.S. agriculture is heavily subsidized and commodity payments affect agricultural 
concentration through subsidies. Figure 2 depicts the value of commodity program 
payments from 1980 to 2012. The target price adopted to support farm income in the 1973 
Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act was eliminated by the FAIR Act in 1996, and 
restored by the 2002 Farm Bill. In addition, the 1996 FAIR Act made oilseed eligible for 
government payments. 
The second strategy uses the value of commodity program payments to instrument 
agricultural concentration. The first stage is specified as: 
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛾2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐶𝑍𝑖 +  𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 +
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑡,          (16) 
where 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes the value of government payments CZ 𝑖 receives at year 𝑡. Other 
notations have the same meaning as before. Commodity program payments before and 
after the 1996 FAIR Act are determined as: 
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡 = {
∑ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑖
𝑀
𝑚=1          if year < 1996
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖1996               if year ≥ 1997
                             (17) 
where 𝑚 represents the five commodities: feed grains, wheat, rice, cotton, and wool that 
are eligible for payments before 1996. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡 and 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑖 denote the payment rate and 
production acres of commodity 𝑚  at time 𝑡 . 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡  is the subsidy rate per acre, and 
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖1996  denotes CZ 𝑖′𝑠  historical acreage included in the flexibility production 
contracts in 1996. 
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The validity of using 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡  as an instrument relies on the assumption that, 
conditional on controls, 𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡  only affects the 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡  through 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡.  The 
interaction terms 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑖  and 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖1996 are similar to the “Bartik 
instrument (Bartik, 1991),” in which an exogenous variable, 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡 (𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡), is interacted 
with 𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚𝑖 (𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖1996)  to construct a variable that varies by CZ and time. 
Conceptually, the identification is similar to a Difference-In-Difference (DID) estimation 
strategy, except that the treatment is continuous. The first-stage compares the farm 
concentration in CZs with more eligible commodity acres with CZs that have less eligible 
commodity acres, and in years following high rate with years following low rate. The 
reduced-form estimates make a similar comparison with concentration in the food 
manufacturing sector as the outcome. 
There are several threats to this strategy. First, 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡 might be endogenous because it 
is determined by bargaining among farmers, food manufacturers, government officials, and 
related players. To alleviate this concern, I check the robustness of the results restricting 
the analysis to the subsample after 1996. In addition, although 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡 is much less likely to 
be endogenous than 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑡 because the subsidy rate per acre is predetermined in each 
Farm Bill, there is a concern that the 2SLS estimate of 𝛼1 captures the spurious trends 
between 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡 and 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 (Christian and Barrett, 2017). I conduct a randomization test 
by randomizing the treatment variable, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡, across CZs within the same year, and a 
null impact would indicate that this spurious trend does not cause bias. 
Similar to strategy 1, I use the value of government payments in last year as the 
instrument. The 2SLS estimate of 𝛼1 captures the local average treatment effect (LATE) 
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for compliers, defined as agricultural sectors that become more concentrated (or more 
competitive) after receiving more government payments. 
1.4.4 Strategy 3: A quasi-natural experiment in the oilseed sector 
The third strategy exploits a policy in the 1996 FAIR Act that made oilseed eligible for 
government payments. The U.S. is the world’s largest soybean producer and exporter. 
Oilseed, particularly soybean, makes a large net contribution to the U.S. agricultural trade 
balance. Figure 3 shows the trend of HHI of oilseed and non-oilseed sectors from 1982 to 
2012. 
I use the following specifications to investigate whether the concentration in oilseed 
manufacturing responds to the concentration in oilseed production after the policy change: 
𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 + 𝐶𝑍𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡,                                             (18.1) 
𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝜑2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 +
𝐶𝑍𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜔𝑗𝑖𝑡,   (18.2) 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  equals 1 if 𝑡 is after 1996, and 0 otherwise. 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents acres of 
oilseed production for industry 𝑗.13 All other notations have the same meaning as before. 
Livestock industries and industries that use grain as inputs are excluded because 
livestock and crop manufacturing are different, and grain crops have been receiving 
government payments since the 1980s. The treatment group includes two industries that 
use oilseed as raw materials: NAICS 311224: Soybean and other oilseed manufacturing and 
 
13 If food industry 𝑗 uses oilseed as an input, 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡  equals the acreage of oilseed production in CZ 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡. If food industry 𝑗 does not use oilseed as an input, 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡  equals 0. Sane as before, the upstream-
downstream linkage for each food manufacturing industry at the 6-digit NAICS code level is identified based 
on the 2007 Input-Output table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2018). 
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NAICS 311225: Fats and oils refining and blending. The control group includes nine 
disaggregate food manufacturing industries. (Table A.1 in Appendix B presents the 
industries included in the analysis.)  
𝜑1  captures the difference in the impact of government payments on agricultural 
concentration between treatment and control industries before and after 1996. Because the 
identification is similar to a DID strategy, there is a parallel trend assumption that, 
compared with other sectors, the market concentration in oilseed manufacturing sector in 
CZs with more oilseed production was not significantly different from that in CZs with less 
oilseed production before 1996. I test this assumption with a placebo test by restricting to 
the subsample from 1982 to 1997 and assuming a policy change in 1987, the census year 
before the actual policy change. 
1.4.5 Bounding the true effect 
Because 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑖𝑡 have a correlation of 0.0125 and any instrument is likely to 
affect 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑖𝑡 via both 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑖𝑡, point identification of 𝛼1 cannot be achieved. 
However, with several assumptions and information from data, it is possible to obtain 
informative bound estimates by estimating two IV specifications: one with and one without 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑖𝑡 as an additional control (Leamer, 1981; Dunn, 2012).
14 To this end, I bound the true 
effects for each of the identification strategies. 
Suppose the two specifications with and without the control variable 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑖𝑡 are: 
 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼01 + 𝛼11𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                         (19.1) 
𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾01 + 𝛼21𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡.                     (19.2) 
 
14 Please refer to Leamer (1981) and Dunn (2012) for detailed assumptions. 
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Assume the instrument 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 affects 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 via both 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡, and the true 
effect of 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 on 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 is 𝛼12. Suppose α1A and α1B are the estimates of 𝛼12 from 
(19.1) and (19.2), we get the following equations with assumptions about the exogeneity 
of 𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1A = 𝛼12 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)/𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)                                     (20.1) 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1B = 𝛼12 − 𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡),                                               (20.2) 
where 𝜃 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑅𝑂) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)/𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)  measures if 
the correlation between IV and 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼 is stronger than that between IV and PRO. 
Because, other things being equal, higher production leads to lower prices and smaller 
firms are more likely to survive, I assume 𝛽11 < 0. Bounding estimates from α1A and α1B 
depend on the signs of 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂),  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉,𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)
, 𝜃, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 c𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡).  For each 
strategy, I calculate c𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)/𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼) to test if the instrument affects 𝑃𝑅𝑂 
and 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁 in the same direction, and calculate 𝜃 to test if the instrument is strong, and 
then bound the true effect depending on the sign of c𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡). Table A.2 in Appendix 
C provides detailed bounding rules.15 
1.5 Empirical Results 
1.5.1 Strategy 1: Weather as the instrument 
Panels A and B in Table 2 present the OLS and 2SLS estimates. The first and second 
columns show results from the model without and with 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 as a control, respectively. 
 
15 For instance, when 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂) > 0 and the instrument affects farm productivity and concentration in 
the same direction and affects productivity more than does concentration, the estimate without productivity 
as a control is the lower bound of the true impact. 
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All the regressions are weighted by the agricultural production value. Standard errors are 
clustered at the CZ level. The OLS estimates range from 0.125 to 0.127 and are 
significantly positive at 1% level. The 2SLS estimates range from 2.139 to 2.443 and are 
significantly positive at 1% level, with F-statistics greater than 10, indicating that rainfall 
and growing degree-days in current and last year are strong instruments. Because 
precipitation in current year explains most of the variation in agricultural concentration, I 
use precipitation as the instrument in equation (20) to bound the true effect. Because data 
show that precipitation affects agricultural productivity and concentration in the same 
direction and that precipitation correlates more with productivity than with concentration,16 
the two equations in (20.1) and (20.2) are: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1A = 𝛼12 − 29.17 ∗ 𝛽11;  𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1B = 𝛼12 + 0.11 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡). 
When 𝛽11 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) > 0, min [2.139, 2.443] is the upper bound of the 
true effect When 𝛽11 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) < 0, the true effect is bounded by [2.443, 
2.139], which does not hold. Therefore, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) > 0 and the upper bound of the true 
effect is 2.139. 
Overall, this strategy indicates a one-percentage-point increase in the HHI of the 
agricultural production sector increases the HHI of the food manufacturing sector by at 
most 2.139 percentage points. 
 
16 The partial correlation between precipitation and production is c𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂) = −0.035, and the partial 
correlation between precipitation and farm concentration is 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼) = 0.0012.  Therefore, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉,𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)
= −29.17 < 0 .  𝜃 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑅𝑂) −
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂,𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)
= 0.0012 ∗ 0.87 ∗ 0.87 −
−0.035
0.0108
= 3.24 > 0. 
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1.5.2 Strategy 2: Commodity program payments as the instrument 
Panels A to C in Table 3 present the OLS, 2SLS, and first-stage estimation results when 
the value of commodity program payments is used as the instrument. The first and second 
columns show results from the model that without and with 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡  as a control, 
respectively. The 2SLS estimates range from 0.500 to 0.732 and are significantly positive 
at the 1% level in both models, with F-statistics greater than 10. The first stage results show 
a positive relationship between commodity payments and agricultural concentration, 
indicating that higher government payments make agricultural production more 
concentrated, supporting the findings of Key and Roberts (2006) and Roberts and Key 
(2008). Because data show that government payments affect agricultural productivity and 
concentration in the same direction, and government payments affect productivity more 
than concentration, 17 the two equations in (20.1) and (20.2) are: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1A = 𝛼12 + 0.16 ∗ 𝛽11;  𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1B = 𝛼12 + 0.04 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) 
When 𝛽11 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) > 0, the true effect is bounded by [0.500, 0.732]. 
When 𝛽11 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) < 0max [0.500, 0.732] is the lower bound of the true 
effect. Quantitatively, a one-percentage-point increase in the HHI of the agricultural 
production increases the HHI of food manufacturing by at least 0.500 percentage points. 
As previously mentioned, the validity of 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖1996 as the instrument relies 
on the assumption that 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡 affects food manufacturing via the agriculture sector, but this 
assumption could be violated if there is a spurious similar trend between 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑡 and 𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
 
17 The partial correlation between payments and production is c𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌, 𝑃𝑅𝑂) = 0.029, and the partial correlation between payments and 
agricultural concentration is 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼) = 0.18.  Therefore, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌,𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)
= 0.16 > 0 .  𝜃 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑅𝑂) −
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂,𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)
= 0.18 ∗ 0.87 ∗ 0.87 −
0.029
0.0108
= −2.55 < 0. 
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To test for this spurious relationship, I do a randomization test by re-randomizing the 
treatment variables within the same year across CZs, while keeping instruments and other 
variables the same. This randomization breaks the mechanism via which the annual 
variation in subsidy rate works, and the distribution of coefficients of this new pseudo-
dataset would move relative to the 2SLS estimate and center around zero if the 
identification is not affected by selection bias and spurious time trends. If the spurious 
relationship does exist, the relationship between agricultural production and manufacturing 
would remain. 
I ran the randomization test 1000 times with CZ, industry and state-by-year fixed effects. 
Figure 4 plots the distribution of the 2SLS estimates. The coefficient centers around zero 
and is insignificant, validating the assumption that it is the variation in the subsidy rate 
rather than a spurious trend between subsidy rate and concentration in the food 
manufacturing sector that drives the estimation results. 
1.5.3 Strategy 3: A quasi-natural experiment in the oilseed sector 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of equation (18). Panels A to C present the OLS, the 
2SLS, and the first-stage estimation results. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level. 
Columns 1 and 2 present the results when 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑗𝑖𝑡 is not included and included, respectively. 
The OLS estimates are insignificant in both specifications. The 2SLS estimate in 
specification 1 is significantly positive at 0.714, while the 2SLS estimate in specification 
2 is 0.659. Because data show that government payments affect agricultural productivity 
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and concentration in the same direction, and government payments affect productivity 
more than concentration does,18 the two equations in (20.1) and (20.2) are: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1A = 𝛼12 + 0.69 ∗ 𝛽11;  𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1B = 𝛼12 + 0.0045 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡). 
When 𝛽11 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) > 0 , the true effect is bounded by [ 0.714, 0.659 ]. 
When 𝛽11 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) < 0, max [0.714, 0.659] is the lower bound of the true 
effect.  
This strategy relies on the parallel trend assumption that the trend of the concentration 
in oilseed manufacturing in areas with more oilseed production would be the same with 
less oilseed production if the policy change were absent. I conduct a placebo test by setting 
a policy change in 1987 and rerunning the model using data from 1982 to 1992. The 
estimation results in Table 5 show no significant impact, indicating that the parallel trend 
assumption is valid.  
Overall, this strategy indicates that after the policy change, the oilseed production sector 
becomes more concentrated, and so does the oilseed manufacturing sector. Quantitatively, 
a one-percentage-point increase in the HHI of the oilseed production sector increases the 
HHI of the oilseed manufacturing sector by at least 0.714 percentage points. 
1.5.4 Discussion and interpretation of the true impact 
All the three strategies give a lower bound greater than zero, indicating that we can be 
confident in the results, at least in terms of the direction of the influence of agricultural 
 
18 Data show that partial correlation between payments and production is c𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑃𝑅𝑂) =
0.031, and the partial correlation between payments and agricultural concentration is 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗
𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼) = 0.045. Therefore, 
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡∗𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡∗𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡,𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)
= 0.69 > 0 . 18𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼) =
 0.047 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑅𝑂) = 11.42. Therefore, 𝜃 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑅𝑂) −
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡∗𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂,𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼)
= 0.045 ∗ 11.42 −
0.031
0.047
= −0.15 <0. 
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concentration on concentration in food manufacturing. The first strategy gives a lower 
bound of 2.139, the second strategy gives a lower bound of 0.500, and the third strategy 
gives a lower bound of 0.714. Therefore, a one-percentage-point increase in the HHI of 
agricultural production leads to an increase in the HHI of food manufacturing by at least 
0.500 percentage points. Moreover, the finding that OLS estimates are always smaller than 
the 2SLS estimates and that higher agricultural concentration leads to higher food 
manufacturing concentration supports the theoretical proposition by Mérel and Sexton 
(2017) that a more concentrated food manufacturing sector leads to a more competitive 
agricultural production sector. 
I also assess the magnitude of the causal impact at the sample means when the HHI of 
food manufacturing distribution is 0.709 and the HHI of agricultural production is 0.406. 
The estimate of 0.500 indicates that a 2.5% increase in the HHI of agricultural production 
causes about 0.7% of the increase of the HHI of food manufacturing. 
1.6  Mechanism Tests 
Here I test the predictions in propositions 1 and 2 that higher agricultural concentration 
increases the intermediate input price and wages of workers in the food manufacturing 
sector, thereby increasing the concentration of food manufacturing. 
I calculate county-level agricultural price using data on the market value and production 
quantities from the Census of Agriculture:19 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡
,𝐽𝑗=1                                                 (24) 
where 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes the standardized price of commodity 𝑗  in county 𝑖  at time 
𝑡. 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the value of agricultural commodity 𝑗. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the total market value 
 
19
 Although the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) provides price data for a few commodities 
at the state level, the data are incomplete. 
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of agricultural products. 20  The linear correlation between the calculated agricultural 
commodity price and price data reported in NASS is 0.7, lending support to the validity of 
the calculated price. I first test the impact of agricultural concentration on agricultural 
commodity price using: 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,    
(25.1) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the constructed price for all agricultural commodities, and other 
notations have the same meaning as before. I then test the impact of agricultural price on 
the concentration in food manufacturing by: 
𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                        
(25.2) 
I use weather and government payments to instrument 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡. Results in Panel A of 
Table 7 indicate that a unit increase of production Gini increases the agricultural price by 
0.586%~1.039%, lending support to Proposition 1, that a more concentrated agricultural 
sector leads to higher agricultural prices. Results in Panel B show that a 1% increase in the 
input price increases the Gini coefficient of food manufacturing sector by 0.307%. Overall, 
the results validate the proposition that a more concentrated production sector leads to 
higher agricultural commodities prices, making the food manufacturing sector more 
concentrated. 
1.7 Additional Robustness Checks 
This section tests the dynamic relationship between agricultural production and processing 
and examines the spillover effects of agricultural concentration across CZs. 
1.7.1 Dynamic impact of agricultural concentration 
I use the following two specifications to explore the dynamic relationship between the two 
sectors: 
 
20 Prices that exceed the 95th percentile are replaced with the average agricultural prices in other counties 
within the same state. 
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𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜆1𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜗1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝐶𝑍𝑖 + 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡.              
(21.1)  
𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜆2 + 𝜆3𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜆4𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜗2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡+𝐶𝑍𝑖 + 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡.(21.2) 
I estimate equation (21.1) using the lag of weather conditions and lag of government 
payments as the instruments. Estimating equation (22) directly could cause bias due to 
autocorrelation of error terms. Following Arellano & Bond (1991), I use a system GMM 
method to deal with this problem (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; 
Blundell & Bond, 2000; Roodman, 2009). 
Table 6 presents the estimation results. The first and second column presents the 2SLS 
estimates when the lag of 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 and the lag of government payments is used as the 
instrument for 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1,   respectively. The third and fourth columns present the 
Arellano-Bond estimates in the model (21.2) when weather and government payments are 
used as instruments, respectively. The AR (1) statistic fails to reject the hypothesis of no 
first-order correlation of the error terms, and the AR (2) statistic suggests that there is no 
second-order correlation of the error terms. The Sargan test indicates that the instruments 
are appropriate and strong. The results indicate that the main finding, that higher 
agricultural concentration increases concentration in food manufacturing sector, still holds 
even when the dynamic relationship is considered. 
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1.7.2  Spillover effects of neighboring CZs 
It is difficult to define the suitable level of geographic aggregation that captures the market 
integration of the agricultural and food system. I include agricultural production and 
concentration in neighboring CZs as additional controls in the following model: 
𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜅2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜅3𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜅4𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 
+𝛿5𝑋𝑖𝑡+𝐶𝑍𝑖 + 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 ,                                           (22) 
where 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 denotes the production-value weighted HHI of agricultural production 
in CZ 𝑖′𝑠 neighboring CZs. 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡 represents the average agricultural production per 
farm in neighboring CZs, and other notations have the same meaning as before. 
Table 7 presents the estimation results. The 2SLS estimates indicate that the impact of 
agricultural concentration on food manufacturing concentration ranges from 0.365 to 1.024 
and is statistically significant, whereas the impact of agricultural concentration in 
neighboring CZs on the concentration in food manufacturing sector is negative, indicating 
that 𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 and 𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡  affect the food manufacturing sector differently and the local 
economy still matters. 
1.8 Conclusion and discussion 
There has been a marked increase in the concentration of US agricultural production since 
the 1970s. While the growing concentration in the agricultural production sector has been 
widely documented, there is little research investigating whether the concentration in the 
agricultural production sector spreads to other sectors of the food supply chain even though 
this is very relevant in the U.S. modern agricultural and food markets. This article develops 
a theory to explore how agricultural concentration affects concentration in the downstream 
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food manufacturing sector and then uses CZ-level data across agricultural sectors to 
investigate if the concentration change in the farm sector is transmitted to the food 
manufacturing sector. I find that a one-percentage-point increase in the HHI of agricultural 
production leads to at least 0.5 percentage point increase in the HHI of the food 
manufacturing sector, which indicates that a 2.5% increase of HHI of agricultural 
production increases the HHI coefficient of the food manufacturing sector by 0.7% at the 
sample mean. This finding remains robust to the dynamic impact of agricultural 
concentration and the spillover effects of agricultural production and concentration in 
neighboring counties. These findings have important policy implications in the sense that 
it indicates when we evaluate the impact of agricultural policies that could affect farm 
concentration, we should also take the potential impact of a more concentrated food 
processing sector into account, including both the impact of efficiency gains and market 
power.  
This article contributes to the understanding of the widespread increasing concentration 
in the U.S. economy and suggests several important avenues for future research. First, we 
need to better understand the mechanisms that underlie the relationship between 
concentration spillovers between two sectors. Collecting and analyzing farm-level and 
firm-level data would be extremely helpful in identifying the role of product and labor 
markets in the ripple effect of concentration identified here. In addition, this research 
initiates a line of research about the spillover effects of concentration across industries, and 
future research can investigate if the ripple effect of concentration also exists between food 
manufacturing and food wholesaling, and food wholesaling and food retailing industries to 
better understand the economy-wide rise in concentration. 
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Another drawback of this article is that it only provides reduced-form evidence that 
concentration change can spread across sectors, but sheds little light on how to incorporate 
this spillover effects into a general framework to analyze the welfare implications of 
agricultural and food policies that could change the concentration of any sector within the 
supply chain, whether they are weather shocks, government commodity payments, or trade 
shocks. One important research avenue is to develop a framework that incorporates the 
supply chain structure and that can be used for welfare analysis of agricultural and food 
policies. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of main variables. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  All sample 1982 2012 
Farm structure    
HHI of agricultural production 0.406 0.264 0.509 
  (0.950) (0.168) (1.605) 
Market structure of food processing    
HHI of food processing 0.709 0.734 0.753 
  (0.320) (0.277) (0.298) 
Weather    
Precipitation (1000mm) 2.746 2.866 2.554 
 (1.983) (1.888) (2.023) 
Growing degree days (1000 F) 20.483 19.334 21.188 
  (13.562) (13.023) (13.986) 
Agricultural payments (Million dollars) 7.370 6.104 7.676 
 (1.449) (1.449) (1.081) 
Number of sectors 53 53 53 
Number of CZs 682 682 682 
N 41310 4705 6920 
 Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for the whole sample. The sample contains 41,720 
observations covering 682 CZs and 53 food manufacturing sectors over seven census years from 
1982 to 2012. 
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Table 2. The impact of agricultural concentration on that of food manufacturing sector: Using 
rainfall and growing degree-days in last year as the instrument. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Panel A: OLS estimate    
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.127*** 0.125*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
R-square 0.530 0.530 
Panel B: IV estimate   
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 2.139*** 2.443*** 
 (0.276) (0.356) 
F-statistic 18.723 13.091 
Panel C: First stage results   
𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡 0.017*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
2  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡−1 0.016*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡−1
2  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
R-square 0.629 0.630 
Controls (for all panels)   
Production No Yes 
Time-variant CZ characteristics Yes Yes 
CZ fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 40310 40310 
Notes: This table reports the effects of the HHI of agricultural production on the HHI of food 
manufacturing using weather in current and last year as instruments. Models 1 and 2 present the 
results when CZ, sector, and state-by-year fixed effects are included. Model 1 does not include 
productivity as a control, and model 2 includes variable productivity as a control. Standard errors 
are clustered at the CZ level and are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represents significance 
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3. The impact of agricultural concentration on that of food manufacturing sector: Using 
value of commodity payments in last year as instrument. 
 
  (1) (2) 
Panel A: OLS estimates   
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.127*** 0.125*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
R-square 0.530 0.530 
Panel B: IV estimates   
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.500*** 0.732*** 
 (0.098) (0.165) 
F-statistic 33.077 22.004 
Panel C: First stage   
𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑃𝐴𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 0.040*** 0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
R-square 0.711 0.750 
Controls (for all panels)   
Production No Yes 
Time-variant CZ characteristics Yes Yes 
CZ fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 40310 40310 
 
Notes: This table reports the effects of the HHI of agricultural production on the HHI of food manufacturing using 
government commodity payments as instruments. Model1 does not include productivity as a control, and model 2 
includes productivity as a control. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ level and are reported in parenthesis. *, **, 
and *** represents significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4. The impact of upstream concentration on downstream concentration: Using oilseed sector 
as an example. 
 
  
Without 
production 
With 
production 
Panel A: OLS estimate   
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
R-square 0.455 0.455 
Panel B: IV estimate   
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.714* 0.659** 
 (0.387) (0.302) 
F-statistic 8.252 12.826 
Panel C: First stage 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.026*** 0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
R-square 0.280 0.286 
Controls (for all panels)   
Production No Yes 
Time-variant CZ characteristics Yes Yes 
CZ fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 15192 15192 
 
Notes: This table reports the effects of the HHI of agricultural production on the HHI of food 
manufacturing using oilseed sector as an example. Model 1 does not include productivity as a 
control, while model 2 includes productivity as a control. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ 
level and are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represents significance level of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
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Table 5. Placebo test of identification three. 
 
  
Without 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(1) 
With 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 
(2) 
Dependent variable (Panels A, B, and C): 𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑗𝑖𝑡  
Panel A: OLS estimates   
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.004 0.004 
 (0.072) (0.072) 
𝑅2 0.816 0.817 
Panel B: 2SLS estimates   
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 5.011 5.003 
 (4.200) (4.195) 
F-statistic 2.336 2.336 
Panel C: First stage 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑖𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
𝑅2 0.959 0.959 
Controls Yes Yes 
CZ fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
State-year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4809 4809 
Notes: This table reports the results of the placebo test of the parallel assumption that the trend of 
market concentration in oilseed manufacturing sector in areas with more oilseed production would 
be the same with less oilseed production if it were not for the policy change in 1997. I restrict the 
analysis to data before 1996 and set a policy change in 1987 and rerun the model using data from 
1982-1992. Model 1 does not include productivity as a control, while model 2 includes 
productivity as a control. Only observations before 1997 are included. Standard errors are clustered 
at the CZ level and are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represents significance level of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 6. Dynamic impact of agricultural concentration on the concentration in food manufacturing 
sector. 
 
  2SLS model GMM model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Using lag of weather 
as instrument 
Using lag of payments 
as instrument 
Weather as 
instruments 
 Payments as 
instruments 
𝐷𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1   0.611*** 0.246*** 
   (0.019) (0.023) 
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡   0.004*** 0.003*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 2.543*** 0.201   
 (0.565) (0.278)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CZ fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 26874 26874 26874 26874 
F-statistics 12.794 5.103   
AR (1)   0.000 0.000 
AR (2)   0.265 0.332 
Sargen-test     138.37 133.32 
 
Notes: This table reports the results when I include the lag of the HHI of the food manufacturing 
sector as a control. Models 1 and 2 present the 2SLS results, in which I use the lagged weather and 
lagged payments as instruments for the HHI of agricultural production, respectively. Models 3 and 
4 present the results of for equation (21.2), in which lagged weather and government payments are 
used as instruments, respectively. The number of observations is less than that in the full sample 
because CZs with only one period of data are dropped. AR (1) tests the first-order correlation of 
the error terms and AR (2) tests the second-order correlation of the error terms. All regressions 
include productivity as controls. *, **, and *** represents significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
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Table 7. Robustness check: Controlling the agricultural production and concentration in 
neighboring CZs. 
 
  Using weather as IV 
Using government 
payments as IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: OLS estimate     
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡  0.120*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
𝑅2 0.531 0.532 0.531 0.532 
Panel B: IV estimate     
𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.556*** 1.024*** 0.384** 0.365** 
 (0.195) (0.197) (0.159) (0.156) 
𝑁𝐸𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 -0.026*** -0.036*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
F-statistic 39.115 44.906 17.049 17.906 
Controls (for all panels)     
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑗𝑡 Yes No Yes No 
Time-variant CZ characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CZ fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State by year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40310 40310 40310 40310 
Notes: This table reports the 2SLS estimation results when the agricultural productivity and 
concentration in neighboring CZs are included. Models 1-2 use weather conditions in the last year 
as the instrument and use the full sample. Models 3-4 use government commodity payments in the 
last year as the instrument. Models with an odd number do not include productivity as control, and 
models with even number include productivity as a control. Standard errors are clustered at the CZ 
level and are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** represents significance level of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively.  
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Fig. 1. Distribution of HHI of farm production overtime. 
 
Notes: Based on data from the Censuses of Agriculture. 
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Fig. 2. Value of government commodity payments: 1980 – 2012. 
 
Notes: This graph shows the value of government commodity payments from 1980 to 2012. Data 
come from USDA, ERS Farm Income and Wealth Statistics (2018). Before 1996, commodity 
payments consisted of payments for feed grains, wheat, rice, cotton, and wool. From 1996 to 2002, 
commodity payments were production flexibility contract payments. Since 2002, the FSRI Act has 
replaced the FAIR Act, and agricultural payments consist of two components: the fixed direct 
payments that remain uncorrelated to price or production quantity, and counter-cyclical payments 
that depend on the price after harvest. 
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Fig. 3. The trend of HHI in oilseed and nonoilseed sectors. 
 
Notes: This graph shows the CZ-level average HHI of oilseed and non-oilseed sectors in census 
years from 1982 to 2012. The graph is based on the author’s calculations.  
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Fig. 4. Distribution of the 2SLS estimates using randomized HHI of agricultural production. 
 
Notes: This figure shows the kernel density and histogram of the estimated coefficients of the 
randomization test in which the HHIs of agricultural production within a year are randomized 
across counties. I do 1000 regressions and exclude the top 5 percentile and bottom 5 percentile of 
the distribution for scaling purposes
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Chapter 2  
How Does SNAP Affect Diet Quality? Evidence from FoodAPS  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is the largest food and nutrition 
program in the U.S. to ensure disadvantaged citizens have access to food.21 Although 
researchers agree that SNAP alleviates food insecurity by relaxing food budgets (Kreider 
et al., 2012; Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Bonanno and Li, 2015), there is no agreement on SNAP’s 
impact on diet quality (Butler et al., 1985; Devaney and Moffitt, 1991; Yen, 2010; 
Fernandes, 2012; Gregory et al., 2013; Gregory and Deb, 2015). Theoretically, SNAP 
participation affects households’ diet quality via an income effect (an increase in the food 
budget) and a substitution effect (substitute from food-away-from-home (FAFH) to food-
at-home (FAH) because SNAP  benefits can only be used to buy FAH, and substitute from 
unhealthy to healthy food within FAH because SNAP has healthy eating educational 
components), so its overall effect on diet quality remains uncertain and is an empirical 
question. 
USDA’s National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) 
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of SNAP participation on diet quality 
and to explore the underlying mechanisms. First of all, compared with data from dietary 
 
21 SNAP was called the Food Stamp Program (FSP) before 2008 and was renamed as SNAP in 2008 
under the 2008 Farm Bill (The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008). 
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recall interviews, FoodAPS requires participants to scan barcodes on food items and save 
receipts from stores and restaurants, which increases the accuracy of food purchase data. 
FoodAPS also checks households’ SNAP participation status against the administrative 
data, and this partially alleviates underreporting of SNAP participation. In addition, 
FoodAPS provides nutrition information for each food item, making it possible to analyze 
the impact of SNAP on overall diet quality as well as on each diet component. FoodAPS 
also contains data on both FAH and FAFH, making it possible to analyze SNAP 
participants’ substitution between FAH and FAFH. 22  However, while FoodAPS has 
several advantages, we need to point out that it also contains underreporting and 
misreporting of food purchases, as pointed out by Hu et al. (2017). In addition, FoodAPS 
collects food acquisition rather than food intake data. While FAFH acquisitions are likely 
to be consumed immediately, most FAH acquisitions are consumed over time. In this paper, 
we use the acquisition data to estimate diet quality. 
We use the Healthy Eating Index (HEI) developed by the Center for Nutrition Policy 
and Promotion (CNPP) to measure how well the diet conforms to the recommendations of 
the Dietary Guidelines for Americans (DGAs) (USDA, 2010).23 There are three versions 
of the HEI: HEI-2005, HEI-2010, and HEI-2015. Because FoodAPS was conducted 
between 2012 and 2013 and the 2010 DGAs were in effect when the FoodAPS data were 
collected, we use HEI-2010. HEI-2010 is a summation of subscores on twelve nutrition 
 
22 Participants were asked to distinguish between “food and drinks brought into the home” and “meals, snacks, 
and drinks you got outside the home”. Although such a clear distinction was not always made by the 
respondent and foods of both types appear in the FAH and FAFH datasets, and we need to use place type and 
place name as well as item description to help characterize the acquisition event. We checked thoroughly on 
the potential misclassification of FAH and FAFH, and only a negligible portion of foods are wrongly 
classified. 
23 The Healthy Eating Index (HEI) is a scoring metric that can be applied to any defined set of food. See 
https://epi.grants.cancer.gov/hei/ for more details. 
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components. It ranges from 0 to 100 and is a valid and reliable measure of diet quality. A 
higher HEI represents a more nutritionally adequate and balanced diet (Guenther et al., 
2008, 2013; Smith, 2017). Appendix A provides details of the calculation of the HEI-2010.  
Utilizing FoodAPS, we first conduct two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations to 
explore the impact of SNAP participation on dietary outcomes. The 2SLS estimates show 
that SNAP participation has no significant effect on overall diet quality. We further divide 
FAH into 10 USDA food categories based on the classification by the ERS research group 
(Mancino et al., 2010) and classify FAFH into seven categories based on acquisition places 
to explore the impact of SNAP participation on expenditures on different food categories 
and HEI-2010 subscores. 24  We find that SNAP participation significantly decreases 
unhealthy FAFH acquisition and increases the acquisition of certain FAH categories 
including dairy, protein, grains, vegetables, and fats, but it does not lead to changes in any 
HEI subscores. 
To further understand why SNAP has no effect on diet quality, we develop a theoretical 
model to illustrate how SNAP affects food purchasing behavior. The model predicts that 
SNAP participation has a positive impact on diet quality if at least one of the following 
conditions holds: i) there is a strong mental accounting effect that SNAP dollars are for 
healthier food, and ii) there is a persistent increase in healthy eating awareness upon SNAP 
participation. 
The first condition suggests that SNAP households purchase healthier (unhealthier) 
food with SNAP dollars than they do with cash income. Hastings and Shapiro (2018) 
 
24 HEI-2010 is a sum of subscores on 12 components, including total fruit, whole fruit, total vegetables, 
greens and beans, whole grains, dairy, total protein food, seafood and plant proteins, fatty acids, and three 
moderation components: refined grains, sodium, and empty calories. 
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interpreted the excessively larger marginal propensity to consume SNAP-eligible food out 
of SNAP benefits with a mental accounting effect (Thaler, 1985). We employ a household 
fixed effects model to estimate the marginal propensity to purchase certain food 
subcategories with SNAP benefits and with cash dollars, and then compare whether the 
two propensities are significantly different. We find no evidence that SNAP households 
mentally treat SNAP dollars as healthy food money. 
While SNAP households have a well-documented expenditure cycle (Wilde and Ranney, 
2000; Hastings and Washington, 2010; Castellari et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2016) and 
energy intake cycle (Shapiro, 2005), the second condition predicts a diet quality cycle as 
the result of the declining healthy eating awareness in a benefit month.25 The declining 
healthy eating awareness could be caused by substituting calories for quality or difficulty 
in obtaining variety when resources are limited at the end of the month. We include a 
dummy variable representing the day in a SNAP benefit month in the household fixed 
effects panel model to test this diet quality cycle. We find that, conditional on 
comprehensive covariates, SNAP households’ FAH HEI is the highest right after the 
benefit receipt and decreases until the end of the benefit month. 
This study contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, it provides solid 
evidence that SNAP participation has no impact on diet quality based on a national dataset 
that contains nutrition information for both FAH and FAFH. In addition, we test two 
reasons why SNAP has no effect on diet quality. We find no evidence for the anecdote that 
SNAP households use SNAP benefits for healthier food, and we document that SNAP 
households have a diet quality cycle. The finding of a diet quality cycle complements 
 
25 A SNAP benefit month starts with the day of benefit receipt and ends one day before the next benefit 
receipt. 
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current literature that documented the SNAP expenditure and energy intake cycles using 
NAHNES and FoodAPS data (Todd, 2014; Todd and Gregory, 2018; Dorfman et al., 2018; 
Whiteman et al., 2018) by documenting a declining purchase quality while addressing the 
issue of selection-on-unobservables. These findings suggest that there is no one simple 
reason for the null impact of SNAP on diet quality, and thus validating the necessity of a 
policy portfolio, including restricting the purchase of unhealthy food with program benefits, 
subsidizing households’ purchase of fruit and vegetables, providing nutritional guidance, 
and distributing benefits more than once a month to improve diet quality of SNAP 
participants. 
2.2  Data 
2.2.1 Data source 
Our data come from FoodAPS, a national survey of both the daily FAH and FAFH 
acquisition for 4826 U.S. households over one week between April 2012 and January 2013 
(USDA, 2016). Households are required to write information in their food books, scan 
barcodes on foods, and save their receipts from stores and restaurants. It needs to be noted 
that FoodAPS collects acquisitions rather than intake data. While FAFH acquisitions are 
likely to be consumed immediately, most FAH acquisitions are consumed over time. We 
use the acquisitions data to estimate diet quality in this paper. Compared with other datasets 
like the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), SNAP 
participation information is also checked against administrative data, making it more 
suitable for investigating the diet quality of SNAP households. In addition, FoodAPS 
employs the Household Survey of Income and Program Participation + (MATH SIPP+) 
Microsimulation model to simulate households’ SNAP eligibility (Leftin et al., 2014), 
 51 
 
which is a good instrument to address the endogeneity of SNAP participation. FoodAPS 
also contains a variable of when SNAP benefits were last received on each survey day, 
which can be used to track the days since the last receipt of SNAP benefits to investigate 
the cyclical behavior of SNAP households.26 
Our final sample consists of food purchase data for 4696 households, among which 
1497 are SNAP households.27 Among all the sample households, 371 have no FAH trips 
while 424 have no FAFH trips. Therefore, our analysis of FAH is based on 11,306 FAH 
trips of 4325 households, and the analysis of FAFH is based on 18,037 FAFH trips of 4272 
households. 
2.2.2  Diet quality: Healthy Eating Index 
FoodAPS converts each food item into 37 USDA Food Patterns (FP) components, based 
on which the HEI-2010 can be calculated. HEI-2010 can be applied at different levels to 
measure the overall quality of a set of food items. We aggregate the FP components and 
calories of food items purchased within one day and calculate daily HEI (overall HEI), 
FAH HEI, and FAFH HEI. Although we can calculate trip-level HEIs, it is worrisome that 
a household buys different types of food in different stores within one trip, and FoodAPS 
records purchases from different stores as separate trips. If some stores are specialized in 
selling food items with higher levels of certain food components, then trip-level food 
bundles are unbalanced, and the corresponding HEIs would be biased.  
 
26 FoodAPS provides the estimate of when SNAP was last received on each survey day by using the date 
that was reported in the initial interview or the date from the matched administrative data.   
27 We drop 130 households from the raw data because of missing data on food purchases. 
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To calculate household-level HEI, we can use either the simple average or energy-
weighted daily HEI over the survey week.28 Because daily FAFH acquisition resembles 
actual daily FAFH intake, the 7-day FAFH HEI and 7-day FAFH subscores are plain 
averages of the daily FAFH HEI and daily subscores. As for the household-level FAH HEI, 
we use the energy-weighted average of the 7-day FAH HEI since daily FAH purchases 
may be consumed later. However, since the daily FAH purchases may yield biased 
subscore estimates, we aggregate all FP components and the corresponding energy intake 
within the 7-day period to calculate the 7-day FAH (or overall) subscores. 
2.2.3 The instrument: simulated SNAP eligibility 
We use SNAP eligibility as the instrument of actual SNAP participation status to address 
the endogeneity of SNAP participation. FoodAPS simulates the SNAP eligibility for 
individuals and households using the MATH SIPP+ Microsimulation model, which 
accounts for a comprehensive set of household characteristics and state-level eligibility 
rules, like the broad-based categorical eligibility (BBCE).29 Table B.1 in Appendix B 
presents all the variables used to construct the simulated SNAP eligibility.  
FoodAPS provides four measurements of simulated SNAP eligibility because of the 
uncertainty in the construction of SNAP units and the determination of gross income. 
Although one household generally has one SNAP unit (a group of people who live and 
prepare meals together), it is possible that a household might take advantage of the 
eligibility rules and strategically split up into two or more SNAP units. In addition, 
 
28 The energy-weighted average approach naturally comes from the definition of HEI index, which is 
essentially a nutrition density per energy unit (1000 calories) intake.  
29 BBCE is a policy that households may become categorically eligible for SNAP if they qualify for a 
non-cash Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or State maintenance of effort (MOE) funded 
benefit. 
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households can report their earned income as either gross income or net income, making it 
difficult to determine households’ gross income. Based on different approaches to assign 
SNAP units and approximate gross income, FoodAPS provides four eligibility measures. 
We use the measurement (simulated eligibility four) that accounts for both issues in the 
primary specifications and conduct robustness checks with the other three eligibility 
measurements. 
Studies that employ eligibility as an instrument claim that, conditional on covariates, 
the eligibility depends only on the state legislative environment (Currie and Gruber, 1996a; 
Currie and Gruber, 1996b). However, the legislative environment might be endogenous. In 
our context, if dietary outcomes are among the determinants of the state legislative 
environment, the basic assumptions of the 2SLS estimate would be violated (the exclusion 
restriction. See Appendix C for details). However, the state-level variation in SNAP 
eligibility rules largely reflects the policy changes in the last decade, including rules 
expanding the program eligibility (i.e., BBCE) and raising the program benefits (Andrews 
and Smallwood, 2012), which were designed to increase the participation rates and mitigate 
decreased benefits from other social safety net programs. Therefore, conditional on 
household characteristics, the remaining variation in the simulated SNAP eligibility 
captures the variation in the state-level legislative environment and is independent of the 
dietary outcome. 
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2.2.4 Summary statistics 
Table 1 summarizes the main household level variables.30 We use the imputed quantities 
and expenditures data rather than the original survey data (Mancino et al., 2018). Other 
household-level covariates are presented in Table B.1 in Appendix B. The statistics in 
Table 1 and Table B.2 are nationally representative because they are adjusted by the sample 
weight provided by FoodAPS.31 Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the statistics for the 
whole sample, SNAP households, and non-SNAP households, respectively, while column 
(4) presents the t-test results with respect to the difference between SNAP households and 
non-SNAP households. The expenditures are calculated as the sum of expenditures on food 
items rather than event-level expenditures to exclude tips for FAFH. It is clear that the 
characteristics of SNAP households are quite different from non-SNAP households. The 
average simulated SNAP eligibility for participants is 0.812, indicating 18.7 percent of the 
actual SNAP participants are not eligible according to the simulation.32,33 
Fig. 1 illustrates the distribution of FAH HEIs and FAFH HEIs for SNAP households, 
eligible non-SNAP households, and ineligible non-SNAP households. The quality of the 
constructed HEI-2010 can be validated by several facts in Fig. 1. FAFH HEI is much lower 
than FAH HEI, in line with the widely accepted view that FAFH is less healthy than FAH 
(Lin and Guthrie, 2012). Besides, the HEI of SNAP households is always lower than that 
 
30 No household in FoodAPS changes their SNAP status during the survey week.  
31 All the expenditure measures throughout the paper were calculated by aggregating the costs of food 
items (for FAFH, costs excluding tips). 
32  On the other hand, the average simulated SNAP eligibility for non-SNAP participants is 0.235, 
indicating that around 23.5 percent non-SNAP households are eligible. We empirically test the impact of 
household observable characteristics on the probability of false negatives (households who are not eligible 
but enroll in SNAP) and find no evidence that false negatives are associated with observable characteristics. 
33 IV approach estimates the Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE) for compliers and the false negatives 
alter the scope of the definition of compliers. We checked the robustness of the main results in Table 2 by 
excluding these false negatives and the results are not significantly different from the main results. 
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of non-SNAP households, consistent with the findings of Cole and Fox (2008) and Condon 
et al. (2015). Lastly, the average HEI is 50.312, comparable to 49.25 and 50.50, the HEIs 
for non-SNAP and SNAP households estimated from the 2005 NHANES data (Gregory et 
al., 2013). 
2.3 Impact of SNAP on Diet Quality 
2.3.1  Empirical models 
The basic model used to investigate the impact of SNAP participation on diet quality is: 
                                    𝐷𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖.                                 (1)             
where 𝐷𝑄𝑖  denotes the diet quality of household 𝑖 . 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖  equals to 1 if household 𝑖 
participates in SNAP, and equals to 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖 is a comprehensive set of household 
controls. 𝜀𝑖  is an error term.
34  Directly comparing the diet quality between SNAP 
households and non-SNAP households would be biased because differences in diet quality 
may be caused by observable and/or unobservable characteristics other than SNAP 
participation. Although the selection-on-observables problem can be solved by including 
comprehensive observables as controls, the selection-on-unobservables problem cannot be 
easily addressed, and OLS estimates would be biased. 
To address the endogeneity of SNAP participation, we use the simulated SNAP 
eligibility as the instrument of actual participation status. The first stage of the IV strategy 
is: 
                                             𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖 +𝜖𝑖.                                 (2)                  
 
34 All the household characteristics available are included (Table B.1). To meet the linear form probability 
assumption (Assumption iv, Appendix C) for the LATE (to be mentioned immediately), all these covariates 
enter the model as factorial variables whenever possible. 
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where 𝐸𝑖  is the simulated eligibility of household i. 𝑋𝑖  is the comprehensive set of 
household controls as defined in equation (1). The rationale for using eligibility as the 
instrument relies on two assumptions: 1) SNAP eligibility is strongly correlated with SNAP 
participation, and 2) Conditional on comprehensive observable covariants, the remaining 
variation in simulated SNAP eligibility depends only on the state legislative environment 
and is independent of household dietary outcome. 
Following Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) and Angrist and Pischke (2008), the 2SLS 
estimate provides a local average treatment effect (LATE) for “compliers”, defined as 
households that participate in SNAP if eligible and do not participate if ineligible. 
Appendix C lists the assumptions to ensure that this IV estimate is a good approximation 
of the true LATE. 
2.3.2 Results: the impact of SNAP on overall diet quality 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. Panel A presents the 2SLS results, and Panel B 
presents the OLS results. F-statistics across all specifications are larger than 10, validating 
that eligibility is a strong instrument. Columns (1)-(3) present the results on the impact on 
overall HEI, FAH HEI, and FAFH HEI. The results indicate that SNAP participation has 
no significant impact on FAH HEI, FAFH HEI, and overall HEI. Columns (4)-(6) indicate 
that SNAP participation significantly reduces FAFH expenditures by about $37.75 (63.4 
percent of the average FAFH expenditures), significantly increases FAH expenditures by 
about $53.07 (48.9 percent of the average FAH expenditures) and has no significant impact 
on the overall food expenditures. As for the impact on energy acquired, columns (7)-(9) 
indicate that SNAP participation significantly reduces energy acquired from FAFH yet has 
no effect on energy acquired from either FAH or overall food acquisition. 
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The difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates is informative with respect to self-
selection of SNAP participation. When the outcome is diet quality, 2SLS and OLS 
estimates have no obvious differences. When the outcome is food expenditures, OLS 
estimates are biased downward in FAH expenditures and upward in FAFH expenditures 
compared to 2SLS estimates, indicating that households with lower FAH expenditures and 
higher FAFH expenditures are more likely to participate in SNAP. As for energy 
acquisition, OLS estimates are biased upward in both FAH and FAFH energy acquisition, 
indicating that households with higher energy acquisition are more likely to join in SNAP. 
2.3.3  Results: SNAP on food subcategories and HEI subscores 
Given the results that SNAP has no significant impact on diet quality, it would be 
interesting to explore the impact of SNAP on expenditures on food subcategories and on 
HEI subscores. The ERS research group has developed a classification scheme that assigns 
FAH into 8 main food categories: dairy, protein, mixed dishes, grains, snacks, fruits and 
vegetables, beverages, and fats and oils (Mancino et al., 2018). We separate fruits and 
vegetables into two categories: fruits, and vegetables. In addition, we separate SNAP 
ineligible food categories: alcoholic beverages, protein and nutritional powders from other 
foods and form a new category: SNAP ineligible food. The empirical model is the same as 
the IV strategy illustrated by equations (1) and (2), except the dependent variables. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results about the impact of SNAP participation on 
households’ expenditures on different food categories. Panel A indicates that SNAP 
participation leads to significant increases in expenditures on many FAH subcategories, 
including dairy, protein, grains, vegetables, and fats. The increase in fruits is sizable though 
insignificant. On the other hand, SNAP participation consistently (though not significantly) 
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decreases expenditures on certain FAH categories, such as snacks, beverages, mixed dishes, 
and SNAP ineligible food. Panel B suggests that SNAP participation leads to a significant 
decrease in expenditures on fast-food restaurants by $23.85 and a sizable drop in spending 
on convenience stores by $5.413. Overall, the results suggest that SNAP households 
decrease expenditures on fast food and spend more on dairy, protein, grains, vegetables, 
and fats.  
Because expenditure changes might reflect the price changes rather than quantity 
changes, we check the impact of SNAP participation on energy purchased. We find that 
SNAP also affects energy acquisition, validating that changes in food expenditures are not 
entirely driven by price changes. 
Table 4 presents the impact of SNAP participation on the twelve subscores of overall 
HEI, FAH HEI, and FAFH HEI, respectively. SNAP does not influence the subscores 
significantly, except for whole grains. Specifically, the subscore on whole grains decreases 
by 1.74 for FAH, reduces by 0.87 for FAFH, and decreases by 1.74 for overall food. 
Considering that SNAP participation increases FAH expenditures on grains by $4.86 (as 
shown in Panel A of Table 3), we can infer that participants consume more refined grains 
rather than whole grains. In addition, SNAP decreases FAH subscore of empty calories by 
3.902 (significant at 10 percent level), and this reduction is counteracted by the increase in 
FAFH subscore of empty calories. 
The analysis at the subcategory level indicates that SNAP participants avoid consuming 
well-recognized unhealthy food categories (i.e., fast food) and increase expenditures on 
dairy, protein, and vegetables, but these changes lead to little changes in diet quality. The 
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finding indicates that SNAP households may need more detailed diet-quality-improving 
guidance other than broad suggestions like increasing acquisition in certain food categories. 
2.4 The Mechanisms of the Impact of SNAP 
Theoretically, SNAP participation has a positive impact on diet quality if one of the 
following conditions holds: i) there is a strong mental accounting effect that SNAP dollars 
are for healthier food, and ii) there is a persistent increase in healthy eating awareness upon 
SNAP participation (Appendix D  presents a theory to illustrate these predictions). The 
reason for fading healthy eating awareness could be substituting calories for quality or 
difficulty in obtaining variety when resources are limited at the end of the month. We first 
check whether SNAP participants spend SNAP benefits and cash income differently, then 
test whether the diet quality of SNAP households varies across the benefit month. 
2.4.1  Do SNAP households spend SNAP dollars on healthier food? 
We use the following model to examine the marginal propensity to purchase a particular 
FAH category with SNAP benefits and with cash:  
       𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑡 = σ𝑚1 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃,𝑖𝑡 + σ𝑚2 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ,𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑘 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡   
                                 +𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑡 + 𝐷𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑡 + ℎℎ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑚𝑖𝑡.    (3)        
where 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑡 represents household 𝑖
′𝑠 FAH expenditures on food category m at day t. 
𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃,𝑖𝑡  and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ,𝑖𝑡  represent household 𝑖
′𝑠  food expenditures out of SNAP 
benefits and out of cash at day t, respectively.35 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 represents a set of time-variant daily 
 
35 Please note that we do not assign SNAP benefits to any specific items. 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃,𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ,𝑖𝑡 represent 
the total SNAP dollars and cash income spent on a specific day by a household, while the dependent variable 
is the total expenditures on a specific food category calculated by adding the costs of all food items in that 
category. 
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variables. Year fixed effects (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡), month fixed effects (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡), day-of-the-month 
fixed effects ( 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 ), day-of-the-week fixed effects ( 𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 ), day-of-the-
survey-week fixed effects ( 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑡 ), and days-since-last-benefit-receipt fixed effects 
(𝐷𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑡) are used to control for the various shocks that are similar to all households. The 
household fixed effects (ℎℎ𝑖) are included to purge the time-invariant confounding factors. 
σ𝑚1 and σ𝑚2 are the marginal propensity to purchase food category m with SNAP benefits 
and with cash. A significant difference between σ𝑚1 and σ𝑚2 shows SNAP households 
treat SNAP benefits and cash income differently when purchasing food category 𝑚. 
Results in Table 5 do not provide evidence that households mentally segregate SNAP 
benefits from cash income. σ𝑚1  and σ𝑚2  are significantly different only for three food 
categories:  SNAP ineligible food, mixed dishes, and protein. Because SNAP ineligible 
food cannot be purchased with SNAP benefits, it is reasonable that the associated σ𝑚1 is 
economically small and statistically insignificant. Although SNAP households are more 
likely to buy mixed dishes with cash, a major part of mixed dishes is SNAP ineligible, i.e., 
ready-to-eat hot food. As a result, we cannot attribute this difference to the mental 
accounting effect. Although SNAP households have significantly higher propensity to 
purchase protein food with SNAP benefits (0.346) than that with cash (0.211), this 
difference is not economically sizable. Moreover, though SNAP households have a much 
higher propensity to buy snacks with cash dollars (0.312) than with SNAP benefits (0.0842), 
this difference is not statistically significant. 
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We also estimate equation (3) with HEI subscores as the outcomes, and the results are 
presented in Table A3 in Appendix E. The results indicate that SNAP benefits do not lead 
to a higher subscore of any individual nutrition component than does cash income.36 
Overall, we find no evidence that households mentally segregate SNAP benefits from 
cash income to buy certain food categories. Therefore, the proposed mental accounting 
effect that households spend SNAP benefits and cash differently in terms of food 
healthiness does not hold.  
2.4.2 Do SNAP households have a diet quality cycle? 
A diet quality cycle exists if SNAP households’ healthy eating awareness (which increases 
upon receipt of the SNAP benefits) backslides toward the end of the benefit month, thereby 
mitigating the initial improvement in diet quality. We use the following model to explore 
the dietary cycle: 
               𝑌𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝐷𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑘 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 +
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑡 + 𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑆𝑡 + ℎℎ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                                     (4)                                  
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes the outcome of interest (food expenditure, energy acquisition, or HEI) 
of day t of household 𝑖. 𝐷𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑡 represents the dummy of the number of days since last 
benefit receipt, and 𝛾𝑡 tests the conditional benefit-month cycle of 𝑌𝑖𝑡. Other notations are 
the same as before.37  
 
36 The results show that cash income leads to slightly higher whole fruit subscore and dairy subscore than 
SNAP benefits, but we cannot interpret this as households assigning SNAP benefits into unhealthy food 
account. This is likely to be caused by the fact that SNAP households might have difficulties in using SNAP 
benefits on farmers market.  
37 This equation tests if benefit timing affects diet quality. We do not include SNAP expenditure (or ratio 
of SNAP to FAH expenditures) on the right-hand side. 
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We first check the expenditure cycle. We estimate the empirical model in equation (4) 
and present the coefficients of days-since-SNAP-receipt on food expenditures in Fig. 2. 
Panels A-C in Fig. 2 present the coefficients of days-since-SNAP-receipt on SNAP 
households’ FAH expenditures, SNAP benefits expenditures, and the ratio of SNAP to 
FAH expenditures, respectively. There is a clear trend that the total FAH and SNAP 
expenditures drop drastically on the first few days after the receipt of SNAP benefits, and 
then keep decreasing slowly toward the end of the benefit cycle. In addition, the ratio of 
SNAP expenditures to FAH expenditures decreases almost constantly across the benefit 
month, and its absolute value drops by about 0.5 over the month, which is quite large 
considering that the average ratio of SNAP to FAH expenditures on the first day of SNAP 
receipt is 0.69.  
Fig. 3 displays the conditional diet quality of FAH and FAFH across the benefit month. 
The figure shows that the conditional trend of FAH HEI decreases faster in the first half of 
the SNAP benefit month. The absolute value of FAH HEI decreases by almost 10 over the 
benefit month, which is quite considerable given that the 7-year change of SNAP 
households’ average HEI is 4.8 (Cole and Fox, 2008; Condon et al., 2015).38 In contrast, 
the FAFH HEI conditional on all FAFH covariates does not change much across the benefit 
month. 
Considering that Table 2 shows the magnitude of SNAP’s impact on FAH HEI is -2.714 
(insignificant) and the magnitude of the decrease in FAH HEI throughout the benefit month 
is -11.17 (significant at 5 percent level), it is likely that SNAP households have a higher 
overall HEI right after SNAP benefits receipt than they would have if not participate. 
 
38 Using data from NHANES, they found that SNAP households’ average HEI-2005 increased from 52 
(1999- 2004) to 56.8 (2007- 2010). 
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Though this proposition cannot be formally tested because of a lack of data, the impact of 
SNAP participation on overall HEI turns out to be positive (1.083, insignificant) when only 
the first three days after SNAP benefits are investigated.39 These results indicate that the 
dramatically decreasing diet quality within a SNAP benefit month contributes to the null 
impact of SNAP participation on overall diet quality. 
We are not the first to provide evidence of SNAP diet quality cycle. Todd (2014) used 
intake data from the 2007-10 NHANES data and found that HEI falls over the benefit cycle. 
Whiteman et al. (2018) used FoodAPS data and found declines in the purchase quality of 
foods over the SNAP benefit cycle. However, Whiteman et al. (2018) did not deal with the 
endogeneity of SNAP participation. Our analysis contributed to the literature by 
documenting declining purchase quality using food purchase data while addressing the 
issue of selection-on-unobservables. 
2.5 Robustness Checks and Discussion 
This section first examines the potential confounding impact of unemployment, then 
conducts robustness checks with alternative instruments, and lastly discusses other 
potential causes of the diet quality cycle. 
2.5.1 The impact of unemployment  
Suppose a household is eligible for and participates in SNAP because of a family member 
becomes unemployed, we would expect certain changes in the households’ dietary 
 
39 Power calculation based on realized sample distribution and 80-percent statistical power suggests that, to 
detect a 1.5-unit difference in HEI, we need at least 750 observations in the treatment group (750 SNAP 
households). However, we only have data on 400 SNAP households for the first few days since SNAP receipt, 
and this size does not have the statistical power to limit type II errors. 
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outcome, like a decrease in FAFH expenditures, even if SNAP participation plays no role 
in that change.40 This relationship can be accounted for by the proposed IV estimator 
because SNAP participation (and eligibility) is caused by a trend in unemployment status 
(from 0 to 1) instead of selection on time-invariant observables or unobservables. Therefore, 
if the confounding effect of employment exists, the 2SLS estimators in Table 2 capture the 
combined effects of SNAP participation and unemployment. 
To exclude the confounding impact of employment status, we restrict the sample to 
households without unemployed members. Although this might make the estimates 
unrepresentative, it can be informative about the direction and magnitude of the bias caused 
by unemployment-induced participation. Table F.1 in Appendix F displays the results with 
the trimmed sample. Comparing the results with those from the full sample in Table 2, the 
main findings still hold, though the significance level of the impact on FAFH expenditures 
decreases a little. 41  Therefore, the confounding effect of unemployment-induced 
participation is not significant. 
2.5.2 Alternative measurements of simulated SNAP eligibility 
FoodAPS provides four measurements of SNAP eligibility, and we use the fourth simulated 
eligibility that incorporates both gross-net income difference and the possibility of more 
than one SNAP unit in the main analysis. Simulated eligibility one and two allows only 
one SNAP unit in a household, while simulated eligibility one and three treats all reported 
income (including net income) as gross income. However, we cannot argue that the fourth 
 
40 Self-selected unemployment to meet the SNAP eligibility rules could result in the same situation. 
41 The unemployment effect could be the driver of this change, but it is also reasonable to assume that 
this change is driven by heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the difference between the two estimates is not 
statistically significant. 
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simulated eligibility is the best because households’ true SNAP eligibility cannot be 
observed. 
Table F.2 in Appendix F presents the estimation results with alternative instruments. 
The quantitative differences between results in Table F.2 and that in Table 2 come from 
the different definitions of “compliers” and the heterogeneous treatment effects. The main 
conclusion that SNAP households substitute unhealthy FAFH with FAH but do not 
increase their overall diet quality is robust across all specifications.  
2.5.3 Other causes of the diet quality cycle 
Other than the declining awareness of healthy eating over the benefit month, there are 
several other potential reasons for the diet quality cycle. One is the variation of relative 
prices of healthy and unhealthy food over benefit month.  
There are two potential reasons for the rising price ratio of healthy to unhealthy food. 
The first is retailer’s countercyclical pricing strategy (Hastings and Washington, 2010). 
Theoretically, retailers experience predictable cyclicality in consumer demand for food and 
they might strategically increase the price of unhealthy food at the beginning of SNAP 
receipt, and gradually decrease the price of unhealthy food till the end of the benefit month. 
However, the work by Hastings and Washington (2010) is drawn from earlier data in a 
state (Nevada) with a single-day distribution window and is less relevant now because most 
states switched to staggered distribution schedules in recent year. Due to the nationwide 
variation in SNAP benefits distribution schedule (in most states, not all participant 
households receive their benefits on the same day), it’s unlikely that there will be price 
hikes across benefit cycle nationally. Another possibility is the price searching behavior of 
SNAP households over the benefit cycle, including changes in shopping frequency, time 
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spent in individual shopping trips, and store choices. There is evidence that SNAP 
households tend to purchase higher-cost food right after they receive benefits, and then 
select progressively cheaper food as they approach the end of the benefit cycle (Beatty, 
2016). This food price variation over the benefit cycle could potentially be caused by price 
searching behavior. However, to the best of our knowledge, no literature has formally 
tested the existence of any possible price searching behavior. Exploring the causes of price 
variation of healthy and unhealthy food is beyond the scope of this paper, and it is an 
important avenue for future research. 
2.6 Conclusion and Implications 
2.6.1 Conclusion 
This paper has several major findings. First, participation in SNAP has no significant 
impact on food acquisition quality. Second, SNAP participation significantly increases 
FAH expenditures and decreases FAFH expenditures, especially expenditures on fast-food. 
We also find that SNAP participants employ a category-based way to adjust their food 
purchases (i.e., increase acquisition of some food categories while decrease acquisition of 
some food categories), but this strategy does not work well in improving HEI. 
We also develop a model to test two hypotheses about SNAP’s effect. We find no 
evidence for the mental accounting effect that SNAP households use SNAP dollars for 
healthier food and use cash to purchase unhealthy food. However, we find that SNAP 
households have a food acquisition quality cycle, which corresponds to an explanation that 
households’ healthy eating awareness (which increases upon SNAP participation and 
SNAP benefits receipt) backslides toward the end of a benefit month, thereby mitigating 
the increase in diet quality that follows the receipt of SNAP benefits. These findings 
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highlight the importance of practical guidance on improving diet quality and the potential 
role of psychological factors. 
2.6.2  Policy implications 
There is plenty of evidence indicating that not only low-income U.S. households but 
Americans in general, fall short of the Dietary Guidelines for Americans by a large margin 
in nearly every component of diet quality assessed by the HEI (Wilson et al., 2016). Diet 
quality is important to the prevention of many diseases, and improving healthy eating is 
not an easy task and needs persistent efforts from both public policymakers and households. 
However, food purchasing habits are difficult to change, and it’s impossible to find a one-
shot policy that solves this problem once and for all. Based on the findings of this study, 
we find that households manage food purchasing based on their perceptions of certain food 
categories instead of the subtle healthiness differences between food products. Therefore, 
providing practical guidance about food choices, like how to define a nutrition balanced 
diet, how to read food packages, and how to tell subtle healthiness differences, to the 
general public might be helpful.  
As for SNAP households, there are more policy instruments available to promote 
healthy food choices. Previous studies have proposed various policies, such as restricting 
the purchase of unhealthy food with program benefits, subsidizing households’ purchase 
of fruit and vegetables, distributing benefits more than once a month, to improve diet 
quality. As for the food acquisition quality cycle, the government can incentivize 
households to smooth purchases by increasing benefits to households that spend SNAP 
benefits more smoothly. The conditions under which these policies can be effective in 
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promoting healthy food choices and how to leverage potential adverse behavioral responses 
are meaningful avenues for future research. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics on the household level. 
 Variables 
All SNAP Non-SNAP T-test 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dietary outcome over one week     
Total Food expenditure per member ($) 79.929 55.27 83.624 -9.112*** 
 (65.535) (50.276) (66.750)  
FAH expenditure per member ($) 51.55 41.95 52.989 -2.534** 
 (49.690) (41.346) (50.670)  
FAFH expenditure per member ($) 28.379 13.321 30.635 -14.308*** 
 (37.550) (24.939) (38.590)  
Total energy acquisition per member (Kcal) 18849.372 19054.732 18818.599 4.485*** 
 (29643.188) (17372.089) (31068.952)  
FAH energy acquisition per member (Kcal) 14915.629 16108.144 14736.933 5.002*** 
 (29389.038) (17050.597) (30813.094)  
FAFH energy acquisition per member (Kcal) 3933.742  2946.588  4081.666  -2.012** 
 (4305.553) (3339.780) (4413.500)  
Total HEI 50.312 46.902 50.823 -12.905*** 
 (10.444) (9.300) (10.511)  
FAH HEI 52.777 47.753 53.533 -15.832*** 
 (12.555) (11.204) (12.575)  
FAFH HEI 43.019 42.312 43.119 -3.009*** 
 (8.678) (8.503) (8.698)  
Household characteristics     
Number of people staying at residence 2.452 2.99 2.371 11.310*** 
 (1.512) (1.877) (1.433)  
Number of people in the family (related to the 
respondent)  
2.302 2.714 2.24 8.996*** 
 (1.473) (1.797) (1.407)  
Number of guests 0.018 0.04 0.015 3.822***  
(0.157) (0.234) (0.141)  
Individual characteristic     
Household includes an infant aged 3 or less 0.107 0.208 0.092 9.939*** 
 (0.309) (0.406) (0.289)  
Household includes children aged 4 to 19 0.29 0.44 0.267 11.499*** 
 (0.454) (0.497) (0.443)  
Household includes students in private schools 0.017 0.013 0.017 -1.082 
 (0.128) (0.112) (0.130)  
Instrument     
Simulated SNAP eligibility 0.31 0.812 0.235  45.86*** 
  (0.462) (0.391) (0.424)   
Observations 4696 1497 3199   
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means are weighted based on the household weights provided 
in FoodAPS. The T-tests show whether the means are statistically equal between the SNAP group and non-
SNAP group. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. See 
Appendix B for more household-level statistics. 
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Table 2. Impact of SNAP participation on diet quality, food expenditures, and energy intake. 
Dependent variables HEI-2010 Expenditures ($) Energy acquisition (kcal) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
All FAH FAFH All FAH FAFH All FAH FAFH 
Panel A: 2SLS estimates 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 -0.615 -2.714 3.925 15.32 53.07** -37.75** 1897.5 9512.7 -7615.2*** 
 (3.033) (3.733) (2.732) (30.954) (25.498) (17.272) (9117.758) (8938.314) (2002.114) 
R2 0.116 0.117 0.057 0.313 0.225 0.174 0.086 0.061 0.2 
F-statistic 168.233 159.836 146.957 168.233 168.233 168.233 168.233 168.233 168.233 
Panel B: OLS estimates 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 -0.165 -1.269* 0.795 9.808** 17.67*** -7.860*** 9198.7*** 10182.9*** -984.2* 
 (0.560) (0.711) (0.514) (4.494) (3.658) (2.521) (1946.535) (1897.324) (517.243) 
R2 0.116 0.118 0.067 0.244 0.184 0.139 0.088 0.061 0.241 
Household controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4696 4325 4272 4696 4696 4696 4696 4696 4696 
 
Notes: Household-level controls are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
denote significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 3. 2SLS estimates of SNAP’s impact on expenditures on different food categories. 
Panel A: FAH Expenditures 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
FAH Category Ineligible Dairy Protein 
Mixed 
dishes 
Grains Snacks Fruit Vegetables  Beverages Fats 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 
participation 
-4.489   8.157*** 11.01** -1.426 4.858** -0.188 3.23 6.246** -0.651 6.600**
*  (3.866) (2.399) (5.585) (2.656) (2.042) (3.079) (2.34
3) 
(2.797) (2.776) (2.394) 
R2 0.036 0.149 0.133 0.095 0.153 0.159 0.167 0.112 0.164 0.111 
F-statistic = 159.836; Observations: 4325 
Panel B: FAFH Expenditures                 
FAFH Category (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
 
 
  School Work 
Other 
Instituti
on 
Fast-food Full-service 
Convenience 
store 
Other 
types  
  
  
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 
participation 
-0.803 1.41 -0.138 -23.85*** -1.07 -5.413 0.828  
 
 
 (0.864) (1.434) (3.144) (7.924) (11.960) (3.334) (5.14
8) 
 
 
 
R2 0.242 0.06 0.018 0.068 0.154 0.029 0.067      
F-statistic = 146.957; Observations: 4272  
Notes: SNAP ineligible foods include alcoholic beverages, protein and nutritional powders. Household-level controls are 
included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, 
and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4. 2SLS estimates of SNAP’s impact on HEI subscores. 
Panel A: Overall HEI subscores 
  Total fruit 
Whole 
fruit 
Total veg. 
Greens 
&beans 
Whole 
grains 
Dairy 
Total 
protein 
Seafood & 
plant 
protein 
Fatty acids 
Refined 
grains 
Sodium 
Empty 
calories 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 -0.191 0.726 -0.133 -0.224 -1.742* 0.25 -0.432 -0.234 -0.72 -0.071 0.03 -2.276 
 (0.502) (0.559) (0.477) (0.591) (0.924) (0.878) (0.398) (0.583) (1.028) (1.019) (0.208) (1.826) 
R2 0.142 0.137 0.082 0.123 0.043 0.071 0.029 0.085 0.037 0.052 0.042 0.059 
F-statistic = 168.233; Observations=4696 
Panel B: FAH HEI subscores 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 -0.00392 0.913 0.17 0.575 -1.741* 0.432 -0.258 0.151 -0.217 0.592 -0.011 -3.902* 
 (0.548) (0.588) (0.539) (0.587) (1.017) (1.016) (0.557) (0.609) (1.189) (1.043) (0.241) (2.110) 
R2 0.148 0.14 0.076 0.094 0.052 0.06 0.029 0.068 0.033 0.038 0.039 0.039 
F-statistic= 159.836; Observations= 4325 
Panel C: FAFH HEI subscores 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 0.366 0.212 0.669 0.512 -0.867** -0.567 0.262 0.527 0.761 0.379 -0.375 2.005 
 (0.281) (0.294) (0.465) (0.391) (0.404) (0.844) (0.797) (0.376) (0.832) (0.921) (0.807) (1.491) 
R2 0.123 0.134 0.019 0.06 0.001 0.1 0.064 0.048 0.038 0.038 0.04 0.054 
F-statistic = 146.957; Observations= 4272 
 Notes: Household-level controls are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 5. Marginal propensity to purchase different food categories with SNAP benefits and cash. 
  Expenditure on FAH category 
  Ineligible Diary Protein 
Mixed 
dishes 
Grains Snacks Fruit Vegetables Beverages Fats 
SNAP food Exp. (σ𝑚1) -0.0009 0.0515**
* 
0.346*** 0.0727*** 0.0765**
* 
0.0842**
* 
0.0491**
* 
0.0575*** 0.0661*** 0.0982*** 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.039) (0.015) (0.009) (0.025) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Cash food Exp. (σ𝑚2) 0.262*** 0.0700**
* 
0.211*** 0.112*** 0.0820**
* 
0.312** 0.0473**
* 
0.0507*** 0.0743*** 0.0690*** 
 (0.081) (0.008) (0.055) (0.016) (0.009) (0.151) (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) 
Daily controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Month fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-the-month fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-the-week fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day-of-the-survey week fixed 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Day-since-last-benefit fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
household fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 170 1672 2079 1234 1788 2121 1190 1531 2181 1582 
Number of households 126 1045 1178 877 1096 1154 812 977 1151 1013 
R2 0.64 0.587 0.679 0.705 0.636 0.465 0.539 0.542 0.482 0.674 
F-test (σ𝑚1 = σ𝑚2) 9.855 2.635 3.785 2.933 0.173 1.848 0.024 0.117 0.124 1.659 
F-test p-value 0.002 0.105 0.052 0.087 0.678 0.174 0.877 0.732 0.725 0.198 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors on the household level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Because of the limitation in the number of observations, fixed effects model with ineligible 
expenditure as outcome only include day-of-a-week as time fixed effects. 
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Fig.1. HEI of food-at-home (FAH) and food-away-from-home (FAFH). 
 
 
Source: Based on the author’s calculation. 
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Fig. 2. Expenditure cycle over the benefit month. 
Panel A: FAH expenditures 
 
Panel B: SNAP benefits expenditures 
 
Panel C: The ratio of SNAP benefits to overall FAH expenditures 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the day since last SNAP receipt. The vertical axis shows the coefficient of days-
since-SNAP-receipt fixed effect. The expenditure on the initial day of SNAP benefit receipt is set as the benchmark. 
The graphs are based on daily FAH data of 1393 SNAP households and 3715 purchasing days. The main trends 
(connected diamonds) are plots of coefficients of the fixed effects of days since SNAP, conditional on various fixed 
effects and time variant variables. The shadow area envelops the 95 percent confidence interval. 
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Fig.3. The trend of FAH HEI and FAFH HEI over the benefit month. 
 
 
Notes: The FAH HEI trend graph is based on daily FAH data of 1393 SNAP households and 3715 FAH purchasing 
days. The FAFH HEI trend graph is based on daily FAFH data of 1324 SNAP households and 5416 FAFH purchasing 
days. 
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Chapter 3  
Medicaid Expansion and Non-Alcoholic Beverage Choices by Low-Income 
Households 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In 2010, President Barak Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), which included a Medicaid expansion program whose goal was to improve the health of 
low-income Americans through increased health care access and reduced out-of-pocket health care 
spending. Under the Medicaid expansion, all adults and children whose incomes were at or below 
138% of the federal poverty level became eligible for coverage.  However, after the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in 2012 that the ACA Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive to states 
(Rosenbaum and Westmoreland 2012), adoption of the expanded program became optional for 
states. Medicaid enrollment under ACA began on January 1, 2014, and by 2017 approximately 75 
million Americans in 33 states were participating in Medicaid (U.S. Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services 2017). Variation in ACA Medicaid expansion across states (due to the Supreme 
Court ruling) provides an opportunity to identify how changes in health care provision have 
impacted the health of low-income households. 
Previous work on the impacts of Medicaid expansion on low-income households found 
increases in the number of individuals with insurance coverage, a reduction in emergency room 
trips and hospital stays, improved self-assessed health, and a reduction in the number of unpaid 
bills and debt (Nikpay et al. 2016; Simon et al. 2017; Sommers et al. 2016; Cunningham 2008; Hu 
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et al. 2016).  Medicaid participation has also been found to increase utilization of outpatient and 
preventive care services, which often include nutrition education, particularly recommendations 
for diet changes for patients with type 2 diabetes, obesity, and cardiovascular and other diseases 
that can be managed partially through improved nutrition (Bhattarai et al. 2013; Sommers et al. 
2016).  
Based on these findings, the provision of health care through the Medicaid expansion appears 
to relax a household’s budget constraint via reduced out-of-pocket health care expenses and, 
possibly, increased wage-earning potential. Since food is a normal good, particularly for low-
income households, Medicaid expansion should increase food expenditures for households that 
benefit from this policy change and therefore affect food and beverage choices and, potentially, 
diet quality. 42  In spite of Medicaid expansion’s importance in determining health outcomes, 
previous work on its impacts on food and beverage choices and diet quality is lacking. 
Two studies have examined how Medicaid expansion affects diet quality. Nguyen et al. (2016) 
provided baseline data on low-income, uninsured residents’ diet quality in Medicaid expansion 
versus non-expansion states from 2007 to 2012, well before the expansion formally began in 2014. 
Cotti et al. (2019), hypothesized that health care insurance provision would lead to increased “risky 
behaviors,” such as unhealthy food consumption. However, they found little evidence that 
increased purchases of candy, cookies, snacks, and carbonated soft drinks. Further research is 
needed to better understand how Medicaid expansion affects low-income Americans’ food and 
beverage purchasing behavior.   
 
42 While there is some evidence in the public health literature that poorer U.S. households would eat healthier foods 
if they had more resources (Rao et al. 2013; Aggarwal et al. 2016), others argue that eating healthfully is not cost-
prohibitive even for low-income U.S. households (Carlson and Frazao 2012; Stewart et al. 2016).  
 79 
 
Non-alcoholic beverages (NABs) provide a useful case study to examine the causal impact of 
Medicaid expansion on the diet quality of low-income households. First, NABs are an economical, 
nutritional staple in the American diet, particularly among low-income households. Second, there 
is substantial variation in the healthfulness of NABs available for consumption. For example, while 
sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) are considered “unhealthy,” water and milk are deemed as 
healthier choices (U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 2015).43 Third, reducing consumption of added sugar is a major focus of public health 
efforts in the U.S., and various policy options have been considered to achieve this goal, including 
efforts to reduce SSBs consumption.44  As Figure 1 shows, the structure rather than the total 
consumption of NABs has changed significantly over the last several years. While per capita U.S. 
consumption of carbonated soft drinks (CSDs) has been declining over the last 15 years, 
consumption of bottled water and other SSBs has been increasing among the general population. 
However, analysis of changes in the NAB purchasing behavior of low-income households, 
particularly in light of Medicaid expansion, is lacking.  
To address this gap, we first develop a conceptual analysis of Medicaid expansion effects on 
the healthfulness of NAB choices and then identify potential income and nutrition education 
effects of those choices on beverage purchases. To empirically test these effects, data on household 
grocery store purchases of NABs from 2013 to 2016 is drawn from the Kilts Center’s Nielsen 
Consumer Panel. NABs examined include: CSDs, non-carbonated soft drinks (nCSDs, e.g., juices, 
juice drinks, and tea), milk, and bottled water. In addition to presenting a triple differences model 
of households NAB purchases by categories using ineligible households as a control group, this 
 
43 A large body of evidence linking diet-related chronic diseases like obesity and type 2 diabetes to consumption of 
SSBs (Bleich et al. 2008; Drewnowski and Specter 2004; Han and Powell 2013; Hu 2013; Hu and Malik 2010). 
44  These include taxes, educational campaigns, and restrictions in federal nutrition programs such as SNAP 
(Finkelstein et al. 2013; Pomeranz 2012). 
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study also examines changes in NAB purchasing at the product-brand level using a mixed logit 
demand model that includes sugar content as a product characteristic, which allows for more 
detailed insight into household purchases, including changes in responsiveness of household 
purchases to price changes of healthy and unhealthy beverages.  
Results indicate that Medicaid expansion led to increases in soda, fruit juice, and fruit drink 
purchases and reductions in bottled water purchases among the Medicaid-eligible population. No 
discernable effects on milk and tea purchases were found.  Results from the mixed logit demand 
model indicate that Medicaid-eligible households increased both their purchase of and preference 
for sugary beverages after Medicaid expansion. These results are statistically significant, robust 
and surprising.  We attribute the unintended impact to two factors: First, SSBs are normal goods, 
and Medicaid expansion significantly relaxes the household budget constraint, creating a strong 
income effect. Second, studies have shown that lower-income households prefer taste over 
nutrition in choosing their foods and beverages. Chidmi and Lopez (2007), for example, found that 
households in the lower income quintile have a higher preference for sugar and a lower preference 
for fiber in their purchases of breakfast cereals than do higher-income households.  
3.2 Conceptual Analysis 
The conceptual model focuses on the effects of Medicaid expansion on consumer valuation of 
healthy vs. unhealthy beverage options due to two economic effects: an income effect from the 
partial relaxation of the budget constraint and an education effect due to nutrition knowledge 
transmitted to participants by medical practitioners. The conceptual model is based on the 
following assumptions. First, let the beverage choices in question be divided into two groups: 
healthy and unhealthy. Second, let consumer utility be separable from purchasing non-beverage 
products. Third, Medicaid participation enhances the consumer budget by an amount m by 
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relieving the budget constraint. Fourth, Medicaid participation provides access to health care that 
may increase nutrition knowledge (𝜀) to encourage healthy beverage choices and discourage 
unhealthy ones, so that the potential marginal utility of this education is positive for healthy 
beverages and negative for unhealthy ones. Note that education, if effective, can change a 
consumer’s preferences as reflected in a utility function. Accordingly, adopt a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) utility function depicted by: 
𝑢(𝐻, 𝑈) = 𝐴[(𝛽 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀)𝐻𝛾 + (1 − 𝛽 − 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀)𝑈𝛾] 1 𝛾⁄ ,                       (1) 
where A is a scale parameter; H is the quantity of healthy beverages; U is the quantity of unhealthy 
beverages;   is the utility weight of the healthy relative to the unhealthy beverages; 𝑀𝑒𝑑 equals 
one if the consumer participates in Medicaid expansion (and zero otherwise); 𝜀 indicates nutrition 
education received under Medicaid expansion; and 𝛾 = (𝜎 − 1) 𝜎⁄ ,  where 𝜎  is the constant 
elasticity of substitution between healthy and unhealthy foods. Note that nutrition education for 
Medicaid participants shifts the CES utility function in (1).  The term (𝛽 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀) is the weight 
on healthy foods, while the term (1 − 𝛽 − 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀) is the weight on unhealthy foods. In the absence 
of Medicaid, the lower bound for 𝛽 = 0 when there is no utility weight assigned to healthy food 
and 1 when there is an absolute preference for healthy food. 
 We define the consumer’s budget constraint as 𝑦 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑚,  where 𝑚 is the Medicaid subsidy 
applicable to participants, and y is the budget in the absence of Medicaid.45 The consumer’s choice 
problem is to maximize the following Lagrangian function: 
Max 𝐹(𝐻, 𝑈, 𝜆) = 𝐴[(𝛽 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀)𝐻𝛾 + (1 − 𝛽 − 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀)𝑈𝛾] 1 𝛾⁄  
                                                  +𝜆(𝑦 + 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑚 − 𝑃ℎ𝐻 − 𝑃𝑢𝑈),                                      (2)     
 
45 The term 𝑚 applies only to the direct income effect on the consumer, which is only a portion of the actual total cost 
of the program. 
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where 𝑃𝑗 is the price of beverage j (H or U) and other notations are as defined above. The first-
order conditions for the maximization of (2) yield the following Marshallian demands for healthy 
and unhealthy beverages: 
H* = ( 
𝛽+𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀
𝑃ℎ
  )σ   
𝑦+𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑚
⍵
,   U* = ( 
1−𝛽−𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀
𝑃𝑢
  )σ   
𝑦+𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑚
⍵
,                                     (3) 
where ⍵ = (β+𝑀𝑒𝑑ε) σ 𝑃ℎ
1-σ + (1-β-𝑀𝑒𝑑ε)1-σ 𝑃𝑢
1-σ, and other notations are as defined above.  Thus, 
the income effect of Medicaid expansion leads to an increase in both types of foods under this 
model. Taking the ratio of both expressions in (3) yields: 
 
𝐻∗
𝑈∗
 =  
𝛽+𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀
1−𝛽−𝑀𝑒𝑑𝜀
 
𝑃ℎ
𝑃𝑢
 .                                                               (4) 
An important feature of the model is that income increases are depicted along linear income 
paths with constant 𝐻∗/𝑈∗ ratios. Taking the derivative of (4) with respect to 𝜀:  
ə(𝐻∗ 𝑈∗ )⁄
ə𝜀
 = 
𝑀𝑒𝑑
(1−𝛽−𝑀𝑒𝑑 𝜀)2
  
𝑃ℎ
𝑃𝑢
 >0.  The nutrition education effect could change the ratio of healthy to unhealthy 
foods purchased by Medicaid participants.  Figure 2 illustrates the potential income and education 
effects of Medicaid participation for otherwise identical households. A budget increase of m for 
Medicaid participants moves the consumer equilibrium from point A to B (or A’ to B’). An 
education effect that changes the preference function towards healthier beverages could move the 
consumer equilibrium and, therefore, the indifference curve from point A to A’ (or B to B’).  
Including both effects, the net effect is to increase the ratio H*/U*. Given that changes in Medicaid 
participation can affect the healthfulness of beverage choices from both income and nutrition 
education effects, the following propositions are made: 
Proposition 1:  Medicaid participation relaxes the household’s budget constraint and results in 
an increase in the purchases of beverages, regardless of their healthfulness.  
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Proposition 2: By increasing the nutrition knowledge of participants, Medicaid participation 
results in a decrease in the relative valuation of unhealthy beverages, thus reducing their purchase 
share of unhealthy beverages.   
Proposition 3: Whether participation in Medicaid results in an increase or decrease in the 
valuation (and purchase) of unhealthy beverages depends on the strengths and direction of the 
underlying income and education effects. 
3a.) If the nutrition knowledge effects of Medicaid are weak relative to the increased income 
effects, consumers will increase their purchases of unhealthy beverages. 
3b.) If the nutrition knowledge effects of Medicaid are strong relative to the increased income 
effects, consumers will decrease their purchases of unhealthy beverages. 
Importantly, these effects are also conditioned on the sensitiveness and resilience of consumer 
preference in the first place. As low-income households are assumed to initially prefer taste over 
nutrition, we propose that even if the nutrition effect is null, the constant H/U ratio is less than one 
regardless of the shift in income, meaning that households will increase the share of unhealthy 
beverages relative to healthy ones.  To that end, we propose the following empirical models to 
assess the impact of Medicaid-eligible households’ NAB purchasing choices.  
3.3 Data and Empirical Methods 
3.3.1 Data Source and Identification Strategy 
The data used in this study come from the Nielsen Consumer Panel dataset (NCP) at the University 
of Chicago’s Kilts Center for Marketing.46 The dataset contains about 60,000 households each 
 
46 Access to the Nielsen Consumer Panel data was obtained through the Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy 
at the University of Connecticut. For access to the data (for a fee), researchers are directed to the University of Chicago 
Kilts Center for Marketing to request permission. 
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year, and approximately 80% of households continue to participate in the following year; therefore, 
this household-level panel dataset provides substantial advantages for empirical identification. In 
the triple-difference household fixed effect model, we use purchase data from January 2013 to 
December 2016 for seven NAB categories, categorized as zero-calorie carbonated soft drinks, full-
calorie carbonated SSBs, nCSDs (including fruit drinks, fruit juice, and tea), milk, and water. In 
the mixed logit model, we use purchase data for 27 leading non-alcoholic beverage products, 
including 12 CSDs, six nCSDs, and nine bottled water brands.47  
To generate enough variation for identification, this data spans one year prior to and three years 
after the Medicaid expansion that began in January 2014 for most states.48  Medicaid expansion 
under the ACA and income eligibility rules are used to identify the Medicaid-eligible population.49 
Although households with incomes below 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL) could be 
eligible for Medicaid under the ACA expansion, we follow Cotti et al. (2019) and exclude 
households whose incomes are between 100% and 138% of the FPL to avoid issues of crowding 
out due to the ACA provision allowing households whose incomes are between 100 and 400% of 
the FPL to purchase subsidized private health insurance. We also restrict the sample to households 
in which all household heads are younger than 65 years because persons over 65 are eligible for 
Medicare. Households with members participating in the Women, Infants and Children program 
 
47 We dropped milk in the sample for the mixed-logit due to the lack of significance of Medicaid in the triple 
differences model and because there were only four brands for cow milk (all non-descript private labels) and two 
plant-based milk brands in the top 50 brands in terms of volume purchased. In addition, the current sample generated 
approximately 17 million observations in the mixed logit model making computation time-consuming and 
complicated.  One should note that cow milk purchases are important at the national level, but brand-level purchases 
are restricted geographically due to federal marketing orders that, since 2010, have channeled milk marketing into 10 
well-defined U.S. regions (down from 31 in the 1930s, when the orders were first implemented).  
48 Twenty  states adopted Medicaid expansion as of January 2014: AR, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IA, IL, KY, MA, 
MD, MN, ND, NJ, NM, NV, OH, OR, RI, VT, WA, WI, WV and Washington, D.C. Seven more adopted between 
February 2014 and July 2016 (IN, MI, NH, PA, AK, MT,  and LA). Households in DE, MA, NY, VT, and Washington, 
D.C., are excluded from the analysis because of high coverage for low-income households before 2014. 
49 Because the data does not contain indicators for Medicaid participation, we utilize Medicaid eligibility, following 
Cotti et al. (2019). 
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(WIC) are also excluded from the sample. Finally, households with children are excluded from 
analysis because Medicaid eligibility and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) 
eligibility rules are closely related for these types of households. In sum, identification comes from 
comparing the beverage choices of households that are likely to be eligible for Medicaid under the 
expansion (households with incomes below 100% of the FPL) with households likely to be 
ineligible before and after Medicaid expansion (households with incomes above 138% of the 
FPL).50  
3.3.2 Impact of Medicaid Eligibility on NAB Purchases by Category 
To investigate the impact of Medicaid expansion on Medicaid-eligible households’ beverage 
purchases at the category level, we first estimate models similar to triple-difference models to test 
how Medicaid expansion affects households’ purchases of NAB categories, including low-calorie 
carbonated SSBs, full-calorie carbonated SSBs, bottled water, fruit juice, fruit drinks, tea, and milk. 
The following household fixed effects model is used to test how a household’s likely eligibility 
for Medicaid due to household income and a state’s Medicaid expansion (intent-to-treat) affect 
within-household variation in purchases of NAB products: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜑𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡,                      (5) 
where 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡  denote household, non-alcoholic beverage category, state, and month, 
respectively. 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡  represents household 𝑖′𝑠 purchase of product category 𝑗 at time 𝑡. 𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 equals 1 
if a household is eligible for Medicaid at time 𝑡 , and 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡  equals 1 if state 𝑠 participates in 
Medicaid expansion at time 𝑡 . 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 denotes household demographics, including household size; 
 
50 Although Medicaid expansion could be endogenous due to systematic differences between the purchase levels of 
non-alcoholic beverages among households in Medicaid expansion and non-expansion states, we determined that the 
Medicaid expansion decision is affected by the differing trends in purchases of NABs between Medicaid-eligible and 
Medicaid-ineligible households in expansion and non-expansion states.  
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household head education, race, age, and employment status; and household income. Household 
fixed effects 𝜃𝑖 and state by time fixed effects 𝜑𝑠𝑡 are included to control for household invariant 
characteristics and systematic differences across states over time. 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡  is an error term. The 
coefficient we are interested in is 𝛼3, which measures how purchases of beverages by Medicaid-
eligible household 𝑖  change compared with those of Medicaid-ineligible households when the 
state participates in Medicaid expansion.  
As previously mentioned, the underlying assumption of the model (5) is that pre-expansion 
trends in purchases between high and low-income households converged or diverged in similar 
ways in expansion and non-expansion states. We restrict the sample to data before 2014 and test 
the pre-expansion trend in NAB categories using the following dynamic model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼𝑘𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡−𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡−𝑘
12
𝑘=1 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜑𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡    (6) 
If the coefficients of the interaction terms 𝛼𝑘 are not significant, then the purchase trends of 
Medicaid-eligible and ineligible households in expansion and non-expansion states are similar and 
the identification assumption is satisfied. 
After aggregating households’ purchases by month from 2013 to 2016, our sample consists of 
61,176 households, with 979,934 household-month observations over 48 months in 52 designated 
metropolitan areas (DMAs). Table 1 presents the summary statistics for purchases of the six NAB 
products by Medicaid-eligible and Medicaid-ineligible households. Columns (1)-(2) present 
summary statistics of the purchase amount for Medicaid-eligible and Medicaid-ineligible 
households, while columns (3)-(4) present the share of households that purchase certain beverage 
categories for Medicaid-eligible and Medicaid-ineligible households from 2013 to 2016. On 
average, Medicaid-eligible households purchased more NABs than ineligible households. Notably, 
eligible households bought more soda and fruit drinks and less bottled water than ineligible 
households.  
 87 
 
3.3.3 Impact of Medicaid Eligibility on NAB Purchases at the Product-Brand Level 
To investigate the impact of Medicaid expansion on eligible households’ beverage purchases at 
the product-brand level, and in particular to assess changes in the consumption of sugary beverages 
as a proxy of unhealthfulness of choices, we use mixed logit models to test how consumers’ 
valuation of sugar changes after Medicaid expansion. We include 12 major CSD brands, nine 
major bottled water brands, and six non-CSD brands in the analysis, accounting for nearly half of 
the quantity of NABs in the U.S. between 2013 and 2016, according to the Nielsen dataset. Total 
sugar content per beverage is the primary product attribute of interest in the mixed logit models. 
However, because brand and other characteristics affect consumer choices, we include price and 
other product nutrition characteristics, such as carbonation, sodium, and caffeine content, in the 
mixed logit model. Table 2 presents the product characteristics of the brands included in the sample 
and mixed logit models.51  
We used the mixed logit demand model because it permits analysis of heterogeneity in 
consumer preferences and in product characteristics (McFadden and Train 2000; Walker and Ben-
Akiva 2002).52 More specifically, we assume that consumer 𝑖 chooses a product 𝑗 = {1, … … , 𝐽} 
from a set of competing products to maximize their utility: 
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘𝑗 + 𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑗(𝛾0𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑖𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑖𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡) + 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡 +
𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 ,                  (7) 
 
51 An advantage of Nielsen scanner data over public health datasets, such as the Consumer Expenditure Survey, is that 
it provides highly disaggregate data at the product brand level, offering precision about nutritional choices, particularly 
regarding sugar content. 
52 Compared with other discrete choice models such as BLP (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995), a mixed logit model 
incorporates individual-level information efficiently and is less computationally intensive. We use the mixed logit 
model to estimate the change in a consumer’s purchases of CSDs as well as marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for 
sugar content attributed to Medicaid expansion. 
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where 𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑡  is the price of product brand 𝑗 in market 𝑠  at time 𝑡 . 𝑋𝑘𝑗  is a vector of brand 
𝑗′𝑠 observable product attributes other than sugar. 𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑗 denotes the sugar content of brand 𝑗 and 
is the product attribute of major interest.  Since we are interested in any changes in sugar valuation, 
we interact 𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑗  with other variables to test how the valuation of sugar changes. As in the 
reduced-form analysis in Section 3.1, we include a set of household demographics 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 to test how 
consumers with different incomes, education, ages, and marital status value sugar content.  We 
also include three variables: 𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡, which indicates whether a consumer 𝑖 is eligible for Medicaid at 
the moment they purchase beverages; 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 , which denotes if a household resides in a Medicaid-
expansion state; and an interaction term 𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡,  which captures how a Medicaid-eligible 
household’s preference for sugar changes after Medicaid expansion. The parameter 𝛾4𝑖 captures 
the Medicaid participation effect by measuring changes in consumer valuation of sugar content 
offered in the choice set.  𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡 denotes unobserved brand characteristics, which are captured by 
parent company dummies. 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡  is an iid error term. Parameters 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖, 𝛾1𝑖, 𝛾2𝑖  vary across 
consumers and follow normal distributions. 
Because we are particularly interested in the role of income in shaping the preference for sugar 
content, we further specify that the response to Medicaid expansion is heterogeneous and varies 
by demographics, which is specified as: 
𝛾4𝑖 = 𝛾2̅ + 𝜃4𝐷𝑖 + 𝜅4𝜓4𝑖 ,                                                                  (8) 
where 𝐷𝑖 is a vector of consumer demographics, including income. We also examine whether the 
education level of the household purchaser modifies or mediates our results. 𝜓𝑖  is a standard 
multivariate normal distribution with the scaling factor 𝜅.  Price endogeneity is a lesser issue than 
when using market-level data, as in the typical BLP model, because we are using data at the 
individual consumer level, where price is exogenous. 
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 Combining equations (5) - (6), the final utility is specified as: 
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑘𝑗 + (𝛾1𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑖𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑖𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡)𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑗 + (𝛾4̅ + 𝜃4𝐷𝑖 +
𝜅4𝜓2𝑖)𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡. (9) 
The probability of consumer 𝑖 purchasing product 𝑗 is: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 =
exp (𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡)
∑ exp (𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
.                                                                              (10) 
The coefficients of the term 𝛾4𝑖  measure how a consumer’s preference corresponds to the 
Medicaid expansion regarding sugar content in NABs. If the marginal effect takes a positive sign, 
it means that consumers pay more attention to sugar content in beverages because of the Medicaid 
expansion. Conversely, if the marginal effect is negative, consumers put less weight on sugar 
content in beverages after the health care expansion. Changes in the marginal effect of sugar 
content on choice probability 𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑗⁄  due to the Medicaid expansion are expressed as: 
∆(𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 𝜕𝑠𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑗)⁄
∆𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡∗𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑡
= ∫(𝛾4̅ + 𝜃𝐷𝑖)𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝜓) (1 − 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝜓)) 𝑔(𝜓)𝑑𝜓 ,                     (11) 
where 𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡(𝜓) is the conditional probability on 𝜓. If the marginal effect is negative, it means that 
consumers put less weight on sugar content in their decision making for beverages after the 
Medicaid expansion. 
3.4  Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Results for NAB Purchases at the Category Level 
The reduced-form triple differences results are based on 61,176 households with 979,934 
household-month observations over 48 months in 52 designated metropolitan areas (DMAs), while 
the mixed logit results are based on 16,684,992 observations covering 27 beverages products. 
Before proceeding to the triple difference results, we checked the beverage purchase trends 
 90 
 
between eligible and ineligible households in expansion and non-expansion states. The results are 
presented in Figure 3. We do not find evidence that the pre-expansion trends are different, and the 
results in Table 3 are thus not driven by systematic pre-expansion trends. That is, consistent with 
the findings of Cotti et al. (2019), we do not find significant divergence in purchase patterns before 
expansion.53  
Table 3 presents the triple differences estimation results via equation (5) using. These results 
for Expansion*Eligibility show, as Cotti et al. (2019) did, that, overall, Medicaid expansion has 
no significant impact on NAB purchases. However, there are considerable mixed results when the 
results are disaggregated. While purchases of liquid tea and milk are not affected, household 
eligibility under the ACA expansion results in increased purchase of sodas, fruit juice, and fruit 
drinks. At the same time, it leads to a reduction in the purchases of bottled water, contrary to the 
general trend in the population, pointing to a significant substitution effect across NABs. These 
findings indicate that Medicaid-eligible households are more likely to purchase sugary drinks and 
diet CSDs as a result of the Medicaid expansion.  
3.4.2 Results for NAB Purchases at the Product-Brand Level  
The analysis at the product-brand level for individual household purchases focuses on two 
additional aspects not answered by the NAB category level analysis: changes in the valuation of 
sugar content (a major health issue) and changes in the responsiveness to prices (a major policy 
parameter when evaluating taxes).  
 
53 Although one could attribute this to lack of ex-ante moral hazard or conclude that Medicaid expansion did not have 
a discernable effect on the patterns of beverage purchases, one can explore this conclusion as a working hypothesis 
with a more detailed and structured analysis of beverage purchasing among low-income households as we do below.  
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 Table 4 presents the estimation results for the mixed logit model to test whether there were 
changes in the valuation of sugar content in non-alcoholic beverages after the Medicaid expansion. 
Model (1) does not investigate the heterogeneity of the impact of Medicaid participation on the 
preference for sugar content across household income and education levels. Models (2) and (3) 
show the econometric results when either household education or income is included. Model (4) 
investigates the heterogeneity of the impact of Medicaid participation on the preference for sugar 
content across income and education levels. We focus on the estimation results in model (4). 
 As expected, the probability of beverage selection decreases at higher price levels. As for sugar 
content, eligibility for Medicaid in expansion states results in an increased valuation of sugar 
content, i.e., eligible households purchase more sugary beverages than non-eligible ones. In 
addition, results indicate great heterogeneity in how sugar content affects preferences for NABs. 
Older, married, and more educated households prefer lower levels of sugar compared to younger, 
single, and less-educated households. In addition, the coefficient for Sugar*Eligibility is 
significantly positive, indicating that Medicaid-eligible households value a higher sugar content in 
NABs more than Medicaid-ineligible households do, while the significantly positive sign for 
Sugar*Expansion indicates that households in Medicaid expansion states value a higher sugar 
content more than those in non-expansion states. These results are reinforced by the estimated 
coefficient for Sugar*Eligibility*Expansion, which is significantly positive, indicating Medicaid-
eligible households value a higher sugar content more after the Medicaid expansion began. These 
results conform to the previous results for NAB categories as most  Medicaid-eligible households 
increase sugary beverage purchases after the expansion began. Regarding other nutrition attributes 
of non-alcoholic beverages, consumers’ preferences increase for beverages with higher levels of 
caffeine and carbonation, and decrease for higher levels of sodium.  
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We apply equation (11) to measure the impact of Medicaid expansion on the marginal 
effects of sugar content on NAB purchases, as shown in Figure 4. On average, Medicaid expansion 
increases the marginal probability of purchasing NABs with a higher sugar content among 
Medicaid-eligible households, reinforcing previous results. This is an unintended effect of 
Medicaid expansion, and it is robust and consistent with the results for beverage categories 
presented in Table 3.  
We then calculate own-price elasticities of demand for each brand in the sample with and 
without Medicaid expansion to assess the changes in price responsiveness of low-income 
households, as shown in Table 5. Without Medicaid expansion our estimates range from -0.324 
for Ozarka bottled water to -12.36 for private label regular soda. With Medicaid expansion, our 
estimates ranged from -1.431 for private label regular soda to -2.565 for Tropicana orange juice. 
Overall, the own-price elasticities of demand increase significantly for all beverage brands after 
the Medicaid expansion, except for regular CSDs. The pattern is that the demand for regular sodas 
becomes more price inelastic, i.e., households become more price insensitive, while the demand 
for other drinks, particularly bottled water, become more price elastic, i.e., households become 
more sensitive to price changes.  The magnitude of the estimated own-price elasticities in Table 
5 is in the range of elasticities estimates in previous studies.54  
 
54 Zhen et al. (2013) estimate the average own price elasticities (for the general population for SSB categories) at -
1.035 for regular CSDs, -0.956 for diet CSDs, -1.566 for juices, -1.192 for juice drinks, and -1.703 for bottled water. 
Dharmasena and Capps (2012) report own price elasticities (for the general population for SSB categories) as ranging 
from -0.689 for fruit drinks to -2.255 for regular soft drinks. Jithitikulchai and Andreyeva (2018) focusing on low-
income households in two New England states estimate SSB category-level elasticities between -0.506 for fruit drinks 
to -1.108 for regular soda. Focusing only on our CSD elasticity estimates at the product-brand level, our estimates 
with Medicaid expansion range from -1.431 for private label regular to -2.187 for Diet Dr. Pepper. These estimates 
are consistent with those of Lopez, Liu, and Zhu (2015) who estimated price elasticities between -1.82 for private 
label regular to -2.248 for Diet Dr. Pepper. 
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Regarding our theoretical hypotheses, we empirically confirm Proposition 1: Medicaid eligibility 
participation results in an increase in purchases of NABs in expansion states regardless of the 
healthfulness of the beverages in question. However, Medicaid eligibility also results in an increase 
in the valuation of beverages with higher sugar content, supporting Proposition 3a because possible 
nutrition education effects are either weak relative to the increased income effect or non-existent. 
One possible explanation is that nutrition effects evolve slowly, while income effects are 
immediate. Given the short time span of the data, it may be too early to conclude that Medicaid 
nutrition effects, through increased primary care utilization among eligible households, do not 
matter. 
The unintended impacts reported in the empirical results, that Medicaid expansion has resulted 
in increased preference for and purchases of sugary beverages, highlights the need to supplement 
the medical benefits of Medicaid with diet quality programs, such as nutrition education. These 
results may also indicate that health care providers should be more closely monitoring beverage 
consumption among their patients and advising them to reduce intake of sugary ones.  
There are limitations to the methods used in this study that warrant discussion. First, our dataset 
did not identify households actually participating in Medicaid; we identified Medicaid-eligible 
households in expansion states using an income cut-off. Second, inclusion of NABs purchased 
away from home might provide a more accurate representation of consumer choices and a more 
comprehensive measure of the impact of Medicaid expansion. Regarding the unintended effects 
reported in this article, we do not extend the analysis to fully examine the potential welfare 
consequences of increased purchases of sugar-sweetened beverages among less educated, low-
income households after Medicaid expansion. Such an outcome is likely to be welfare-reducing 
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due to the external health costs of increased added sugar consumption. Finally, extending the 
analysis to food and beverage products beyond the beverages in our sample would be a fruitful 
avenue for future research.  
Irrespective of these limitations, this study is one of few to examine how health care provision 
to low-income households in the U.S., via the ACA Medicaid expansion, impacts food and 
beverage choices. A key strength of this study is the theoretical model developed to show the 
connection between health care provision and food and beverage choices. This model can be 
utilized in future studies to assess broader impacts on diet quality due to changes in federally 
supported health care programs. Further, the identification strategy combined with the mixed logit 
model used to examine changes in NAB purchases due to the Medicaid expansion is on its own an 
important contribution to the literature. This approach can also be utilized in future studies to assess 
how consumer and household preferences for foods, beverage, or other health-related consumable 
products changes as a result of the provision of free or subsidized healthcare.  
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Table 1. Average Households’ Purchase Quantity and Probability of Beverage Categories Per 
Month 
     
  
Average purchase amount (oz) per 
month 
Probability that 
households purchase 
beverages per category 
  
Medicaid-
eligible 
Medicaid-
ineligible 
Medicaid-
eligible 
Medicaid-
ineligible 
Total Non-alcoholic beverages 
ounce (oz) 618.424 573.186   
 (705.609) (723.500)   
Regular CSDs (oz) 153.124 104.035 0.265 0.225 
 (417.285) (347.918) (0.441) (0.417) 
Diet CSDs (oz) 107.973 111.417 0.189 0.195 
 (369.970) (394.134) (0.391) (0.396) 
Bottled water (oz) 118.962 130.605 0.170 0.180 
 (419.511) (461.356) (0.376) (0.384) 
Fruit juice (oz) 24.981 27.723 0.180 0.198 
 (82.140) (84.908) (0.384) (0.398) 
Fruit drinks (oz) 47.270 43.276 0.192 0.191 
 (166.290) (145.789) (0.394) (0.393) 
Liquid tea (oz) 23.456 24.160 0.087 0.092 
 (130.330) (123.767) (0.282) (0.290) 
Milk (oz) 138.617 127.677 0.415 0.421 
 (263.783) (245.800) (0.493) (0.494) 
N 32,809 947,125 32,809 947,125 
 
Note. Medicaid-eligible (Medicaid-ineligible) households are households that are eligible 
(ineligible) for Medicaid in all states. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Data from the Nielsen 
Consumer Panel 2013-2016. N=979,934.  
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Table 2. Nutritional Characteristics of Non-Alcoholic Beverage Brands Used in the Mixed Logit 
Model 
 
Number Brand Product  
Calories  Sugar  Sodium  Caffeine  
Market share 
(2013-2016) per 12 oz 
Grams 
(g)/12 
oz 
Milligrams(mg)/12 
oz 
mg /12 oz 
 CSDs (12)      
1 
Coca-Cola Classic 
Regular 
140 39 50 35 
3.05% 
2 Coca-Cola Diet 0 0 40 47 2.65% 
3 Private Label Diet 0 0 40 31 2.47% 
4 Pepsi Regular 150 41 30 38 2.45% 
5 Private Label Regular 155 42 53 23 1.96% 
6 Pepsi Diet 0 0 35 35 1.82% 
7 Mountain Dew Regular 170 46 65 54 1.54% 
8 Dr Pepper Regular 150 40 55 42 1.43% 
9 Mountain Dew Diet 0 0 50 54 1.07% 
10 Coca-Cola Zero Diet 0 0 40 35 0.98% 
11 Dr Pepper Diet 0 0 55 42 0.88% 
12 Sprite Regular 144 38 70 0 0.78% 
 Water (9)      
13 Private Label  0 0 0 0 11.40% 
14 Nestle Pure Life 0 0 0 0 2.14% 
15 Poland Spring 0 0 0 0 1.20% 
16 Aquafina 0 0 0 0 0.90% 
17 Dasani 0 0 0 0 0.86% 
18 Ice Mountain 0 0 0 0 0.83% 
19 Deer Park 0 0 0 0 0.76% 
20 Crystal Geyser 0 0 0 0 0.75% 
21 Ozarka 0 0 0 0 0.57% 
 nCSDs (6)      
22 Lipton  35 10 64 83 0.88% 
23 Arizona  105 26 15 23 0.85% 
24 Gatorade 95 20 143 0 0.79% 
25 Ocean Spray 150 39 45 0 0.61% 
26 Tropicana 168 33.6 24 0 0.61% 
27 Powerade 80 20 150 0 0.57% 
Note: In the estimation, we exclude calories as a nutrition characteristic because it is highly 
correlated with sugar, which is practically the only source of calories in CSDs. For Lipton teas, we 
use the average sugary content of sweetened and unsweetened products to approximate its sugary 
content.
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Table 3. Results from the Triple-Difference Model Showing the Effects of the ACA Medicaid Expansion on Purchases of Non-Alcoholic 
Beverages by Categories  
 
  Total 
Regular 
CSDs 
Diet 
CSDs 
Bottled 
water Fruit juice 
Fruit 
drinks Liquid tea Milk 
Dependent variable: Purchase quantity per month (oz) 
Expansion*Eligibility 7.718 6.615* 9.394** -11.062** 2.154** 4.384** 0.351 -3.504 
 (8.133) (3.826) (3.816) (5.236) (0.985) (1.797) (1.400) (2.303) 
Eligibility 26.369*** -3.147 6.207** 24.556*** -2.511*** -2.790* 3.314*** 0.214 
 (6.456) (3.037) (3.029) (4.156) (0.782) (1.427) (1.111) (1.828) 
Expansion 14.620*** 2.560*** 2.448*** 2.679** 2.021*** 1.005** 1.464*** 2.229*** 
 (1.797) (0.845) (0.843) (1.157) (0.218) (0.397) (0.309) (0.509) 
Household 
demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-month fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 979,934 979,934 979,934 979,934 979,934 979,934 979,934 979,934 
Note. This table presents the results of equation (5). Household demographics include household size; household head education, race, 
age, and employment status; and household income. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *, **, and *** present significance 
level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4. Mixed Logit Demand Results Showing Changes in Household Preferences for Sugar Content in Non-Alcoholic Beverages 
Before and After the Medicaid Expansion 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Price 4.845*** -6.681*** 4.845*** -6.680*** 4.846*** -6.679*** 4.846*** -6.678*** 
 (0.044) (0.085) (0.044) (0.085) (0.044) (0.085) (0.044) (0.085) 
Purchase in Prior Trip dummy 0.245*** 5.809*** 0.245*** 5.809*** 0.244*** 5.811*** 0.244*** 5.811*** 
 (0.046) (0.104) (0.046) (0.104) (0.046) (0.104) (0.046) (0.104) 
Sodium -0.00259*** -0.000155 -0.00260*** -0.000155 -0.00260*** -0.000156 -0.00260*** -0.000156 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Caffeine 0.00159*** -0.000247 0.00159*** -0.000247 0.00159*** -0.000247 0.00159*** -0.000247 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Carbonation dummy 0.472*** 0.0435*** 0.472*** 0.0435*** 0.472*** 0.0435*** 0.472*** 0.0435*** 
  (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004) (0.014) 
Sugar 0.0131***  0.0139***  0.0133***  0.0140***  
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
Sugar*High Income 0.00139  0.000594  0.00126  0.000589  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Sugar*College -0.00680***  -0.00680***  -0.00686***  -0.00686***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sugar*Young 0.00682***  0.00682***  0.00681***  0.00680***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sugar*Married -0.00217***  -0.00217***  -0.00217***  -0.00217***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sugar*Eligibility 0.0104***  0.00969***  0.0103***  0.00968***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Sugar*Expansion -
0.000489*** 
 -
0.000489*** 
 -
0.000491*** 
 -
0.000491*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Sugar*Eligibility*Expansion 0.00425***  0.00393***  0.00274***  0.00249**  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Sugar*Eligibility*Expansion*High-
income   0.00302    0.00254  
   (0.003)    (0.003)  
Sugar*Eligibility*Expansion*College     0.00620***  0.00613***  
          (0.002)   (0.002)  
N 16,684,992  16,684,992  16,684,992  16,684,992   
 99 
 
Log likelihood -1,768,802.5   -1,768,801.9   -1,768,795.9   -1,768,795.5   
Note: The interaction terms between sugar and indicators for income bracket, college education, age, and marital status are used to detect 
the heterogeneous sugar preferences of different demographic groups. The interaction terms between sugar and eligibility (expansion) 
capture differences in sugar preference between eligible and ineligible households (expansion and non-expansion states). The triple 
interaction term between sugar and eligibility and expansion captures how Medicaid expansion affects the sugar preference of eligible 
households. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5. Changes in the Own-Price Elasticities of Demand for Non-Alcoholic Beverages in 
Medicaid Expansion States 
Brand Brand names 
Simulated 
price 
elasticity 
without 
Medicaid 
Actual price 
elasticity with 
Medicaid 
expansion 
Change 
in 
demand 
elasticity  
CSDs     
1 
Coca-Cola Classic 
Regular -3.429 -1.782 -1.647 
2 Coca-Cola Diet -0.378 -1.917 1.539 
3 Private Label Diet -0.324 -1.647 1.323 
4 Pepsi Regular -4.779 -1.701 -3.078 
5 Private Label Regular -12.636 -1.431 -11.205 
6 Pepsi Diet -0.405 -1.944 1.539 
7 Mountain Dew Regular -3.510 -1.836 -1.674 
8 Dr Pepper Regular -4.347 -1.863 -2.484 
9 Mountain Dew Diet -0.405 -1.998 1.593 
10 Coca-Cola Zero Diet -0.378 -1.944 1.566 
11 Dr Pepper Diet -0.432 -2.187 1.755 
12 Sprite Regular -3.537 -1.863 -1.674 
Water (9)     
13 Private Label -0.945 -4.752 3.807 
14 Nestle Pure Life -0.351 -1.701 1.350 
15 Poland Spring -0.324 -1.593 1.269 
16 Aquafina -0.432 -2.106 1.674 
17 Dasani -0.405 -2.052 1.647 
18 Ice Mountain -0.351 -1.728 1.377 
19 Deer Park -0.378 -1.863 1.485 
20 Crystal Geyser -0.324 -1.566 1.242 
21 Ozarka -0.324 -1.620 1.296 
nCSDs (6)     
22 Lipton  -0.405 -1.944 1.539 
23 Arizona  -1.728 -1.701 -0.027 
24 Gatorade -0.540 -2.079 1.539 
25 Ocean Spray -1.431 -2.268 0.837 
26 Tropicana -0.972 -2.565 1.593 
27 Powerade -0.756 -1.836 1.080 
 
Note: We estimate the actual price elasticity for each brand using the estimates from the mixed 
logit model, and then conduct a simulation by assuming no Medicaid expansion. We then calculate 
the simulated price elasticity for each brand without Medicaid expansion. The statistics are 
reported based on data in Medicaid expansion states.
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Figure 1. U.S. Per Capita Consumption of Non-Alcoholic Beverages, 2004-2018 
 
 
 
Sources: Beverage Digest (2019) for CSDs and nCSDs; Statista (2019a, b) for bottled water and 
milk 2004-2017, extrapolated to 2018 with the 2017-18 rate of growth of per capita consumption 
of single-serving bottled water from the Beverage Digest and the 2017-18 rate of growth of per 
capita milk consumption from USDA (2018). 
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Figure 2. Potential Income and Education Effect of Medicaid Expansion on the Healthfulness of 
Food Choices 
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Figure 3. Pre-Trend Confidence Intervals of the Difference in  the Purchases of Non-Alcoholic Beverages  
Between Expansion and Non-Expansion States  
    
    
 
Note:  These figures show coefficients and 95% confidence intervals calculated from standard errors of the 
interaction term 𝛼𝑘 in equation (6) to test the differences in NAB consumptions between expansion and non-
expansion states up to 12 months prior to 2014—the start of the ACA Medicaid expansion. All the models include 
household demographics and household, state, and year fixed effects. 
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Figure 4. Density Distribution of the Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Marginal Effects of Sugar 
Content in Non-Alcoholic Beverage Purchases  
   
   
Note: The average change in the marginal effect of sugar content on the probability of purchasing 
a non-alcoholic beverage due to Medicaid eligibility and expansion is 0.0023. 
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Appendices 
Appendices for Chapter 1 
“Upstream and Downstream Concentration in the U.S. Agri-food Industries” 
 
APPENDIX A  
THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
A.1 Proof of Equation (11) 
𝜕[(𝑃2 − 𝑤 − 𝑃1)𝑄]
𝜕𝑀
= (𝑃2 − 𝑤 − 𝑃1)
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
+
𝜕[(𝑃2 − 𝑤 − 𝑃1)]
𝜕𝑀
𝑄 
                                 = [𝑃2 − 𝑤 − 𝑃1 + 𝑄𝑃2
′(𝑄)]
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
− 𝑄
𝜕𝑃1
𝜕𝑀
                                            
                                 = [(𝑃2 − 𝑤 − 𝑃1 + 𝑄𝑃2
′(𝑄) − 𝑄MR𝑛𝑄]
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
  
                                 = {−
𝑄
𝑁
𝑃2
′(𝑄) + 𝑄 [−
1
𝑁
𝑃2
′(𝑄) −
𝑄
𝑁
𝑃2
′′(𝑄)}
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
 
                                 = −
𝑄
𝑁
[2𝑃2
′(𝑄) + 𝑄𝑃2
′′(𝑄)]
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
                                                            (A1.1) 
Plugging 𝑃2
′(𝑄) =
𝑃2
𝜀𝑄
 and 𝑃2
′′(𝑄) =
𝜕
𝑃2
𝜀𝑄
𝜕𝑄
=
𝑃2
′(𝑄)
𝜀𝑄
−
𝑃2
𝑄𝜀2
𝜕𝜀
𝜕𝑄
−
𝑃2
𝜀𝑄2
 where 𝜀  denotes 
elasticity of demand in the downstream market, equation (A1.3) can be rewritten as: 
𝜕[(𝑃2−𝑤−𝑃1)𝑄]
𝜕𝑀
= −
1
𝑁
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
[𝑃2 (1 +
1
𝜀
−
𝑄
𝜀2
𝜕𝜀
𝜕𝑄
)]                                         (A1.2) 
Suppose a constant price elasticity of demand, then 
𝜕𝜀
𝜕𝑄
= 0 and 
𝜕[(𝑃2−𝑤−𝑃1)𝑄]
𝜕𝑀
= −
1
𝑁
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
𝑃2 (1 +
1
𝜀
)                                                        (A1.3) 
Equation (2) indicates 𝑃2(𝑄) − 𝑃1(𝑄) − 𝑤 = −
𝑄
𝑁
𝑃2
′(𝑄), then 
𝜕𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑁
𝜕𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑀
=
(𝑃2(𝑄) − 𝑃1(𝑄) − 𝑤)𝑄
𝑁
𝜕[(𝑃2(𝑄) − 𝑃1(𝑄) − 𝑤)𝑄]
𝜕𝑀
 
                                                           =
1
1+𝜀
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑀
𝑄
𝑁
                                                                     (A1.4) 
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 APPENDIX B 
Table A.1 Food manufacturing sectors at the six-digit NAICS level in the analysis 
Commodity / Industry NAICS code 
Soybean and other oilseed manufacturing 311224 
Fats and oils refining and blending 311225 
Breakfast cereal manufacturing 311230 
Sugar and confectionery product manufacturing 311300 
Frozen food manufacturing 311410 
Fruit and vegetable canning, pickling, and drying 311420 
Bread and bakery product manufacturing 311810 
Cookie, cracker, pasta, and tortilla manufacturing 311830 
Coffee and tea manufacturing 311920 
Flavoring syrup and concentrate manufacturing 311930 
All other food manufacturing 311990 
Notes: The information comes from the Input-Output table from BEA (2018).  
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APPENDIX C  
BOUNDING PARAMETERS WHEN THERE ARE TWO POTENTIALLY 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES 
Given the two equations: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1A = 𝛼12 + 𝛽11𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)/𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁)                                        (21.A) 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 α1B = 𝛼12 − 𝜃𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡)                                                (21.B) 
where 𝜃 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁)𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑅𝑂) − 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)/𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁)  measures 
whether the correlation of the IV and 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁 is stronger than that between IV and PRO. 
Based on the signs of  𝛽11, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂),
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉,𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉,𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁)
, 𝜃, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) , it is 
possible to get the bound estimates from the estimated α1A and α1B. Because, other things 
being equal, higher production means a lower price, and small firms are more likely to 
survive when faced with lower input costs, we assume 𝛽11 < 0. We use the following rules 
to bound the true 𝛼12 when 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂) is positive. 
Table A.2 
Bounding parameters based on information from data when 𝛽11 < 0, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂) >
0. 
Assumption From data Lower bound on 𝛼12 Upper bound on 𝛼12 
c𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑂, 𝜖𝑖𝑡) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑃𝑅𝑂)
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝐼𝑉, 𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑁)
 
𝜃   
+ + + Max {α1A, α1B} +∞ 
+ + − α1A α1B 
+ − + α1B α1A 
+ − − −∞ Min {α1A, α1B} 
− + + α1A α1B 
− + − Max {α1A, α1B} +∞ 
− − + −∞ Min {α1A, α1B} 
− − − α1B α1A 
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Appendices for Chapter 2 
“How Does SNAP Affect Diet Quality? Evidence from FoodAPS” 
 
Appendix A. Calculation of Healthy Eating Index (HEI) on Daily Level 
We follow the steps provided by the HEI tools for researchers and calculate HEI on the 
daily level. 55  The HEI-2010 has 12 components: Total Fruit; Whole Fruit; Total 
Vegetables; Greens and Beans; Whole Grains; Dairy; Total Protein Food; Seafood and 
Plant Proteins; Fatty Acid; Refined Grains; Sodium; and Empty Calories. There are three 
steps to calculate HEI for each food trip. 
Step1: Identify the set of food items each day and calculate the nutrient density. 
Because FoodAPS contains the nutrients for each food item within a trip, we aggregate all 
the food nutrients of all trips in one day into the above 12 components and calculate the 
consumption density for each component. 
Step 2: Calculate the HEI subscores for each day 
The calculation of each HEI subscore is as follows: 
(1) HEI-total fruit = 5*(total fruit density/0.8). The density is measured by cup 
equivalent/1000 kcal, and the maximum score is 5. 
(2) HEI-whole fruit =5*(whole fruit density /0.4). The density is cup equivalent/1000 kcal, 
and the maximum score is 5. 
(3) HEI-total vegetables = 5*(total vegetables density /1.1). The density is cup equivalent 
/ 1000 kcal, and the maximum score is 5. 
(4) HEI-greens and beans =5*(greens and beans density/0.2). The density is cup equivalent 
/ 1000 kcal, and the maximum score is 5. 
(5) HEI-whole grains =10*(whole grains density/1.5). The density is ounce equivalent / 
1000 kcal, and the maximum score is 10. 
(6) HEI-dairy= 10*(dairy density/1.3). The density is cup equivalent/1000 kcal, and the 
maximum score is 10. 
 
55 See https://epi.grants.cancer.gov/hei/tools.html for details. 
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(7) HEI-total protein food =5*(total protein food density/2.5). The density is ounce 
equivalent/1000 kcal, and the maximum score is 5. 
(8) HEI-seafood and plant proteins = 5*(seafood and plant proteins density/0.8). The 
density is ounce equivalent/1000 kcal, and the maximum score is 5. 
(9) HEI-fatty acids=10*(fatty acids density/0.8). The density is cup equivalent/1000 
kilocalories, and the maximum score is 5. 
(10) HEI-refined grains = 10*(refined grains density/1.8). The density is ounce 
equivalent/1000 kcal, and the maximum score is 10. 
(11) HEI-sodium = 10*(sodium density/1.1). The density is gram equivalent/1000 kcal, 
and the maximum score is 10. 
(12) HEI-empty calories = 20*(percentage of energy). The density is cup equivalent/1000 
kilocalories, and the maximum score is 20. 
Step 3. Calculate the total HEI score 
By adding up the above 12 subscores, we get the daily HEI.
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Appendix B. Summary Statistics 
 
Table B.1. Summary statistics of household-level variables. 
 Variables All SNAP non-SNAP Variable is used to 
build the instrument 
Geographic location     
northeast 0.155 0.127 0.159  
 (0.362) (0.333) (0.366)  
Midwest 0.314 0.308 0.314  
 (0.464) (0.462) (0.464)  
south 0.354 0.403 0.346  
 (0.478) (0.491) (0.476)  
west 0.178 0.162 0.180  
 (0.382) (0.369) (0.384)  
Drive distance to the primary store 5.089 4.473 5.181   
(7.560) (6.597) (7.690)  
Not reside in a Census core-based 
statistical area 
0.133 0.141 0.132  
(0.340) (0.348) (0.338)  
Live in a rural area based on census 
tract 
0.340 0.290 0.348   
(0.474) (0.454) (0.476)  
Household size     
Number of people staying at 
residence 
2.452 2.990 2.371 Yes 
(1.512) (1.877) (1.433)  
Number of people in the Family 
(related to the respondent)  
2.302 2.714 2.240 Yes 
(1.473) (1.797) (1.407)  
Number of guests 0.018 0.040 0.015 Yes  
(0.157) (0.234) (0.141)  
A child joined in over the past three 
months 
0.009 0.019 0.007  
(0.093) (0.136) (0.084)  
A relative moved in or out over the 
past three months 
0.041 0.052 0.039  
(0.198) (0.222) (0.194)  
Individual characteristic     
Household includes an infant aged 3 
or less 
0.107 0.208 0.092 Yes 
(0.309) (0.406) (0.289)  
Household includes children aged 4 
to 19 
0.290 0.440 0.267 Yes 
(0.454) (0.497) (0.443)  
Household includes a private school 
student 
0.017 0.013 0.017 Yes 
(0.128) (0.112) (0.130)  
Household includes a primary school 
student 
0.116 0.228 0.100  
(0.321) (0.420) (0.299)  
Household includes a middle school 
student 
0.064 0.096 0.059 Yes 
(0.245) (0.295) (0.236)  
Household includes a high school 
student 
0.082 0.093 0.080 Yes 
(0.274) (0.291) (0.271)  
Household includes a student having 
a vacation  
0.060 0.083 0.057 Yes 
(0.238) (0.276) (0.231)  
Household includes a student 
dropped out from school 
0.008 0.024 0.006 Yes 
(0.091) (0.152) (0.078)  
At least one household member is 
elderly 
0.354 0.270 0.366 Yes 
(0.478) (0.444) (0.482)  
Household maintains at least one 
marriage  
0.464 0.263 0.495 Yes 
(0.499) (0.440) (0.500)  
At least one member gets a college 
or higher degree 
0.729 0.454 0.771 Yes 
(0.444) (0.498) (0.420)  
0.038 0.151 0.021 Yes 
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The household has at least one WIC 
member 
(0.190) (0.358) (0.142)  
The household has at least one 
TANF member 
0.006 0.027 0.002  
(0.074) (0.161) (0.048)  
At least one member is unemployed 0.130 0.300 0.105 Yes 
(0.337) (0.458) (0.306)  
At least one member is retired, 
disabled or falls ill 
0.366 0.512 0.344 Yes 
(0.482) (0.500) (0.475)  
At least one member is African 
American 
0.135 0.303 0.110 Yes 
(0.342) (0.460) (0.312)  
At least one member is American 
Indian or Alaska Native 
0.009 0.018 0.008 Yes 
(0.096) (0.134) (0.088)  
At least one member is Asian 0.048 0.018 0.052 Yes 
(0.214) (0.134) (0.223)  
At least one member is Hispanic 0.153 0.290 0.132 Yes 
(0.360) (0.454) (0.339)  
At least one member is on a diet 0.340 0.309 0.345  
(0.474) (0.462) (0.475)  
At least one member uses tobacco 0.301 0.533 0.267  
(0.459) (0.499) (0.442)  
At least one member is obese 
(BMI>=30) 
0.460 0.618 0.437  
(0.498) (0.486) (0.496)  
Income, asset, and expenditures 
variables 
    
F mily average monthly income in 
thousand dollars 
4896.577 1803.969 5359.998 Yes 
(4348.880) (2161.119) (4404.645)  
Household had unusually large 
expense over past month 
0.104 0.150 0.097  
(0.305) (0.357) (0.296)  
Household’s monthly health 
insurance expense 
151.856 40.992 168.468 Yes 
(198.965) (104.834) (204.350)  
Household’s monthly health 
insurance copays 
31.993 14.848 34.563 Yes 
(82.708) (57.021) (85.608)  
Household’s monthly doctor/hospital 
bills 
40.580 17.040 44.108 Yes 
(123.760) (83.486) (128.350)  
Household’s monthly prescription 
drug expense 
39.061 23.929 41.329 Yes 
(73.878) (60.944) (75.370)  
Household’s monthly electricity 
expense 
124.798 111.360 126.811 Yes 
(86.127) (90.794) (85.231)  
Household’s monthly heating fuel 
expense 
29.605 23.869 30.465 Yes 
(59.261) (49.272) (60.574)  
Household’s monthly rent/mortgage 
expense 
709.246 423.374 752.084 Yes 
(644.070) (411.464) (661.505)  
Household’s home insurance 
expense 
46.333 20.724 50.171 Yes 
(94.025) (70.516) (96.481)  
Household’s monthly sewer/garbage 
removal expense 
23.643 16.651 24.691 Yes 
(34.671) (33.109) (34.781)  
Household’s liquid assets level (in 
thousand dollars) 
1.994 1.184 2.115 Yes 
(1.011) (0.566) (1.007)  
Observations: 4697 1498 3199  
 
Notes: Means are weighted by the sample weights provides by FoodAPS. Standard 
deviations are in the parenthesis. 
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Table B.2. Summary statistics of purchases of sub food categories at the household-level. 
 
  All SNAP Non-SNAP 
  (1) (2) (3) 
FAH 
Subcategories 
   
Ineligible 3.868 1.515 4.223 
 (14.466) (6.943) (15.251) 
Dairy 7.811 6.920 7.945 
 (9.476) (9.180) (9.513) 
Protein 19.926 23.543 19.381 
 (23.820) (32.259) (22.227) 
Mixed dishes 6.250 7.009 6.136 
 (10.888) (12.955) (10.538) 
Grains 7.201 6.974 7.236 
 (8.506) (9.420) (8.360) 
Snacks 10.864 11.691 10.739 
 (14.618) (21.059) (13.380) 
Fruit 6.283 4.264 6.587 
 (9.096) (7.258) (9.304) 
Vegetables 7.168 5.227 7.460 
 (9.096) (7.657) (9.259) 
Beverages 9.402 10.324 9.263 
 (11.894) (13.338) (11.656) 
Fats 7.271 7.433 7.247 
 (9.289) (10.866) (9.028) 
N 4325 1393 2932 
FAFH subcategories   
School 0.817 0.288 0.993 
 (3.767) (1.782) (4.142) 
Work 0.676 0.311 0.976 
 (3.560) (1.844) (4.724) 
Other Institution 2.817 1.584 3.237 
 (27.689) (6.807) (20.068) 
Fast-food 15.736 12.237 17.995 
 (22.593) (17.599) (26.802) 
Full-service 22.048 12.697 31.055 
 (40.304) (32.180) (47.493) 
Convenience store 4.684 5.319 4.259 
 (13.997) (17.598) (11.632) 
Other types 5.547 3.417 6.654 
 (15.489) (11.239) (16.922) 
N 4279 1325 2954 
Notes: Means are weighted by the sample weights provides by FoodAPS. Standard 
deviations are in the parenthesis. 
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Appendix C. Assumptions of the IV Strategy 
 
To interpret the proposed 2SLS estimate as a valid LATE, we need the following six 
assumptions. 
Assumption i. Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA): The dietary outcome 
of any household is not affected by the SNAP status of other households, and similarly, the 
SNAP status of any household is not affected by the SNAP status of other households. The 
sample design of FoodAPS naturally ensures this assumption.56 
Assumption ii. Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA, ignorable assignment): 
This assumption suggests that conditional on covariates, the instrument is as good as a 
random assignment, which can be written as: 
{𝑌𝑖(𝐷1𝑖, 1), 𝑌𝑖(𝐷0𝑖 , 0), 𝐷1𝑖, 𝐷0𝑖} ⊥ Z𝑖|𝑋𝑖.                                       (C.1) 
𝑌𝑖(𝐷1𝑖, 1)  and 𝑌𝑖(𝐷0𝑖, 0)  represent household i’s potential outcome when its SNAP 
eligibility and SNAP participation status is all positive and all negative, respectively. 
{𝐷1𝑖, 𝐷0𝑖} represents household i’s SNAP participation status when it is SNAP eligible and 
ineligible, respectively. The conditional independence assumption is to say that the SNAP 
eligibility assignment (i.e., the simulation) does not depend on the actual SNAP status and 
dietary outcome, conditional on all the relevant covariates. This requires the remaining 
variation in the simulated SNAP eligibility (after controlling observables), i.e., the state-
level legislative environment of SNAP eligibility criterion, depends on a complex political 
bargaining process but not on the household-level SNAP status and dietary outcome. 
Assumption iii. Exclusion Restriction: The simulated SNAP eligibility influences the 
household dietary outcome only through the household’s SNAP status. The situation stated 
in Assumption ii that the remaining variation in simulated SNAP eligibility (after 
controlling observables) doesn’t relate to dietary outcome validates this exclusion 
restriction.  
Assumption iv. Relevance: The simulated SNAP eligibility does not have zero impact 
on the treatment variable, SNAP status. The quality of the simulation naturally validates 
this, and an F-statistic greater than 10 also provides evidence.  
 
56 See https://www.ers.usda.gov/media/8804/0_foodaps-user-guide-puf.pdf for details. 
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Assumption v. Monotonicity: There is no one who would have a positive SNAP status 
with negative SNAP eligibility, but not with positive eligibility. This is to say there’s no 
such household satisfying:  𝐷1𝑖 = 0 and 𝐷0𝑖 = 1 (or 𝐷1𝑖 − 𝐷0𝑖 < 0). 
Assumption vi. Linear form probability: The instrument probability function can be 
closely approximated by a linear model, which can be presented as:  
𝑝(𝑋𝑖) = 𝑝(𝑍𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) = 𝑋𝑖
′𝛼.                                      (C.2) 
This assumption is cited in Angrist and Pischke (2008) as a necessity to view the 2SLS 
estimate as a good approximation to the estimation strategy presented in Abadie (2003). 
Given the comprehensive covariates and flexible variable specification used, we claim that 
the linear specification is a good enough approximation to the probability function and that 
the 2SLS estimate is good enough to approximate the LATE of interest. 
Based on the assumptions presented above, the impact of SNAP participation detectable 
by Z𝑖  is always zero for “always-takers” and “never-takers” (Assumption iii exclusion 
restriction), and the existence of “defiers” are ruled out (Assumption v monotonicity). 
These concepts are especially important in our setting, because they show how to choose 
the IV among the four simulated eligibility measures in FoodAPS. All the four measures 
of simulated eligibility in FoodAPS are not the true eligibility, thus errors are inevitable.  
A “false negative” means when the SNAP eligibility is positive, the simulated eligibility 
suggests the household is not eligible. Part of the “false negatives” are observable because 
if we observe a household with a positive SNAP status and negative simulated eligibility, 
it’s certain that it is SNAP eligible and with a false negative simulated eligibility. Consider 
a false-negative household in the LATE setting, it will be an “always-taker” since this 
household will still stay at a positive SNAP status when the eligibility turns from 0 to 1 
according to the monotonicity assumption. Similarly, a “false positive” error would 
increase “never-takers” according to the monotonicity assumption. We argue that the less 
“false negatives” and “false positives” in simulated eligibility, the more “compliers” it 
covers when used as an IV, indicating it captures the LATE for a bigger subgroup. 
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Appendix D. A Theoretical Model 
1. An illustrative theoretical model 
Consider a consumer whose utility 𝑢(∙) is a function of healthy food consumption 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 and 
unhealthy food consumption 𝐶𝑢,𝑡 . The consumer maximizes intertemporal utility under 
budget constraints, specified as: 
                                                    𝐌𝐚𝐱
𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
 𝑈 = ∑ 𝛿𝑡𝑢(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=0 , 
                                                       𝐬. 𝐭. :   𝑟𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑃ℎ,𝑡𝐶ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢,𝑡𝐶𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡,         (D.1) 
 
where 𝑢(∙) is concave, deductible, and increasing in 𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡 . 𝑌𝑡  is the income used to 
purchase food in period t, and 𝑆𝑡 is the saving in period t. 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑢,𝑡 are the unit prices 
for healthy and unhealthy food, and 𝑃ℎ,𝑡 > 𝑃𝑢,𝑡 ∀𝑡. 𝛿 and 𝑟 represent the discount factor 
and interest rate. We use two functions to link consumption (𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡) to energy intake 𝐸𝑡 
and diet quality 𝐻𝑡 , and  𝐸𝑡  increases in 𝐶ℎ,𝑡  and 𝐶𝑢,𝑡 , while 𝐻𝑡  increases in 𝐶ℎ,𝑡  yet 
decreases in 𝐶𝑢,𝑡. 
                                                     𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡).                                                 (D.2) 
                                                     𝐻𝑡 = 𝐻(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡).                                                 (D.3) 
This dynamic maximization yields the following standard Euler equations with respect 
to 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑢,𝑡: 
                                     𝑢1(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡) = 𝑟𝛿
𝑃ℎ,𝑡
𝑃ℎ,𝑡+1
𝑢1(𝐶ℎ,𝑡+1, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡+1),                               (D.4.1) 
                                     𝑢2(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡) = 𝑟𝛿
𝑃𝑢,𝑡
𝑃𝑢,𝑡+1
𝑢2(𝐶ℎ,𝑡+1, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡+1).                               (D.4.2) 
Assume the prices do not change over time for now (this assumption is relaxed in 
Subsection E to explore how healthy and unhealthy food consumption changes as the 
relative prices of healthy and unhealthy food changes over the benefit cycle). To generate 
testable propositions, we assume 𝑢(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡) = 𝑤 ∙ 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
𝜇𝑡𝐶𝑢,𝑡
1−𝜇𝑡, where 𝑤 is a constant 
and 𝜇𝑡 represents the relative preference over healthy food. The intertemporal optimum 
conditions can be written as: 
                                        𝜇𝑡𝐶ℎ,𝑡
𝜇𝑡−1𝐶𝑢,𝑡
1−𝜇𝑡 = 𝑟𝛿𝜇𝑡+1𝐶ℎ,𝑡+1
𝜇𝑡+1−1𝐶𝑢,𝑡+1
1−𝜇𝑡+1       (D.5.1) 
                             (1 − 𝜇𝑡)𝐶ℎ,𝑡
𝜇𝑡𝐶𝑢,𝑡
−𝜇𝑡 = 𝑟𝛿(1 − 𝜇𝑡+1)𝐶ℎ,𝑡+1
𝜇𝑡+1𝐶𝑢,𝑡+1
−𝜇𝑡+1  (D.5.2) 
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𝐶𝑢,𝑡
𝐶ℎ,𝑡
=
𝜇𝑡+1
𝜇𝑡
∙
1−𝜇𝑡
1−𝜇𝑡+1
∙
𝐶𝑢,𝑡+1
𝐶ℎ,𝑡+1
.                                                           (D.5.3) 
Once a household enrolls in SNAP, three factors can potentially influence food 
purchasing behavior: 1) a change in the awareness of healthy eating 𝜇𝑡, 2) a change in the 
total food budget 𝑌𝑡, and 3) a mental accounting effect that uses SNAP dollars for healthier 
food.  
We discuss how these three factors affect food consumption and diet quality. If 𝜇𝑡 
increases ( 𝜇𝑡+1 > 𝜇𝑡 ), the ratio between unhealthy and healthy food consumption 
decreases (
𝐶𝑢,𝑡
𝐶ℎ,𝑡
>
𝐶𝑢,𝑡+1
𝐶ℎ,𝑡+1
). Consider a household enrolling in SNAP at 𝑡0, and this household’s 
awareness of healthy eating experiences a sudden increase: 𝜇𝑡0+1 = 𝜇𝑡0 + ∆,   this 
household’s healthy food consumption will increase, and will its diet quality (𝐻(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡) 
is increasing in 𝐶ℎ,𝑡 but decreasing in 𝐶𝑢,𝑡). However, if the household’s healthy eating 
awareness gradually decreases over the benefit month, the unhealthy-healthy food 
consumption ratio increases while the diet quality decreases over time.                               
Suppose the household’s food expenditure increases by ∆𝑌 after enrolling in SNAP, the 
total food budget constraint becomes: 
                                   𝑟𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝑡 + ∆Y = 𝑃ℎ,𝑡𝐶ℎ,𝑡 + 𝑃𝑢,𝑡𝐶𝑢,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡, ∀ 𝑡 >  𝑡0.             (D.6) 
Although this budget increase would not change the Euler Equations, it alters the optimal 
solutions (𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗ ≠ 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗ , 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗ ≠ 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗ ), which influence the energy intake 𝐸𝑡 and diet quality 
𝐻𝑡 in ambiguous ways (depending on the functional forms of 𝐸𝑡 and 𝐻𝑡).
57 
Assume the household has a mental accounting effect that assumes SNAP dollars are 
for healthier food, then there’s an additional constraint on unhealthy food:  
                                             𝑃𝑢,𝑡𝐶𝑢,𝑡 ≤  𝑟𝑆𝑡−1 − 𝑆𝑡 + 𝑌𝑡 + ∆Y − 𝐵.                          (D.7) 
If equation (D.7) is not binding, the healthy and unhealthy food consumption after enrolling 
in SNAP is still determined by conditions (D.5.1) - (D.5.3) and (D.6) (𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗∗ = 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗ , 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗∗ =
 
57 This argument is based on the mental accounting effect that households treat SNAP benefit as food money, 
and thus they deviate from the optimal consumption (𝐶ℎ,𝑡0
∗ , 𝐶𝑢,𝑡0
∗ ) and consume more food on 𝑡0. If we think 
the post-SNAP consumption as another decision process, the initial condition changes. This is to say, though 
the marginal conditions from Euler equations hold the same after joining in SNAP, the initial condition 
changes (𝐶ℎ,𝑡0
∗∗ ≠ 𝐶ℎ,𝑡0
∗ , 𝐶𝑢,𝑡0
∗∗ ≠  𝐶𝑢,𝑡0
∗ ) lead to a different optimal path (𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗ ≠ 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗ , 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗ ≠ 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗ ). However, the 
directions (whether 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗  and 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗  increase or decrease) of this change depend heavily on the households’ 
utility form. 
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𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗ , ∀ 𝑡 > 𝑡0). However, if equation (D.7) is binding, the optimal conditions would lead to 
more healthy food consumption (𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗∗ > 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗ , 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗∗ < 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗ , ∀ 𝑡 > 𝑡0). 
Based on the illustrative model, we have the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1: SNAP participation has a positive impact on diet quality if one of 
the following conditions holds: i) there is a strong mental accounting effect that SNAP 
dollars are for healthier food, and ii) there is a persistent increase in healthy eating 
awareness upon SNAP participation. 
PROOF: Equation (D.5.3) clearly implies that a persistent increase in healthy eating 
awareness (𝜇𝑡0 + ∆) decreases the unhealthy-healthy food consumption ratio (
𝐶𝑢,𝑡
𝐶ℎ,𝑡
) and 
increases the diet quality (𝐻𝑡 ). The impact of budget increase ∆Y  on diet quality 𝐻𝑡 
depends heavily on the functional form of both 𝑢(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡) and 𝐻(𝐶ℎ,𝑡, 𝐶𝑢,𝑡). If the mental 
accounting effect is strong enough (constraint (9) binds and 𝐵 is large enough), the increase 
in healthy food consumption ratio (𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗∗ > 𝐶ℎ,𝑡
∗∗ , 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗∗ < 𝐶𝑢,𝑡
∗∗ ) raises diet quality 𝐻𝑡.  
Each condition in PROPOSITION is a sufficient condition that SNAP significantly 
improves overall diet quality, but the null result in Section II cannot prove that condition 
(i) or condition (ii) is wrong. For instance, if the mental accounting effect assumes that 
SNAP dollars are primarily used for unhealthy food58, joining SNAP might decrease the 
diet quality, and this counteracts the diet quality increasing effect from healthy eating 
awareness. In this case, we cannot assert that condition (ii) in PROPOSITION is false from 
the finding that SNAP fails to improve diet quality.  
Thus, it is necessary to test if the mental accounting effect does exist in any form. We 
develop Hypothesis 1 and check whether SNAP participants spend SNAP benefits and cash 
income differently. 
Hypothesis 1. There is a mental accounting effect that SNAP dollars are for healthier food.  
 
58 Though this kind of mental accounting behavior might be counterintuitive, it is theoretically possible: 
SNAP households may allocate SNAP benefits to the account of certain food categories, and these categories 
might happen to be unhealthy ones. 
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If the empirical tests for Hypothesis 1 find that SNAP households do not consistently 
buy unhealthier food with SNAP dollars59, condition (i) is false, and this leaves us with 
two possibilities: either there is no increase in healthy eating awareness upon SNAP 
participation or the increase does not persist. We develop Hypothesis 2 to test which 
possibility is true.  
Hypothesis 2. There is an initial increase in healthy eating awareness upon SNAP 
participation. However, this change does not persist over time.   
We empirically test Hypothesis 2 by checking whether the diet quality of SNAP 
households varies across the benefit month.  
 
59 If they do, condition (i) is true. This leads us to an odd situation that SNAP households have higher healthy 
eating awareness and buy healthier food with their own money. However, this doesn’t lead to a healthier diet, 
since they reward themselves with unhealthy food which are mostly bought with costless SNAP benefits. 
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Appendix E. Marginal Effects on HEI Subscores by SNAP Benefits and Cash. 
Table E.1. Marginal changes in HEI subscores by SNAP benefits and cash. 
  FAH HEI subscores 
 
(1) 
Total fruit 
(2) 
Whole fruit 
(3) 
Total veg. 
(4) 
Greens 
&beans 
(5) 
Whole 
grains 
(6) 
Dairy 
(7) 
Total 
protein 
(8) 
Seafood & 
plant protein 
(9) 
Fatty 
acids 
(10) 
Refined 
grains 
(11) 
Sodium 
(12) 
Empty 
calories 
SNAP food Exp.  
0.00429*** 0.00569*** 0.00525*** 0.00331*** 0.00502*** 0.00286 0.0140*** 0.00585*** 0.000568 0.000111 0.00120** 0.00134 
(0.00117) (0.00138) (0.00107) (0.000788) (0.00141) (0.00236) (0.00155) (0.00104) (0.00226) (0.00252) (0.000550) (0.00475) 
Cash food Exp.  
0.00533*** 0.0101*** 0.00657** 0.00644*** 0.00983*** 0.0133*** 0.0158*** 0.00857*** -0.000732 -0.00554** 0.00210*** 0.00270 
(0.00133) (0.00155) (0.00216) (0.00132) (0.00218) (0.00317) (0.00271) (0.00177) (0.00270) (0.00256) (0.000687) (0.00604) 
Observations: 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 3715 
Households 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 1393 
R2 0.090 0.088 0.059 0.076 0.086 0.072 0.155 0.086 0.050 0.044 0.036 0.050 
F-test 
(σ𝑚1 = σ𝑚2) 
0.337 4.675 0.280 3.713 3.085 6.177 0.348 1.544 0.132 2.356 1.258 0.027 
F-test p-value 0.562 0.031 0.597 0.054 0.079 0.013 0.556 0.214 0.717 0.125 0.262 0.869 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. The 
results are based on fixed effects panel regressions with daily level FAH purchase data. The coefficients represent the change in 
specific HEI subscore corresponding to a unit (dollar) change in SNAP benefit food expenditures or cash food expenditures.
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Appendix F. Robustness Checks 
 
Table F.1. Impact of SNAP participation on dietary outcomes for the trimmed sample. 
  HEI-2010 Expenditure ($) Energy acquisition (kcal) 
  All FAH    FAFH All       
FAH 
     
FAFH 
All FAH    FAFH 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 
Participation 
0.57 -3.441 6.504** 24.7 55.08* -30.38 -2997.2 4119.3 -7116.6*** 
 (3.389) (4.229) (3.222) (35.127) (29.607) (18.588) (11176.200) (10991.724) (2150.916) 
R2 0.162 0.153 0.062 0.322 0.235 0.182 0.079 0.058 0.215 
F-statistic 137.51 128.437 113.045 134.09 134.09 134.09 134.09 134.09 134.09 
Household 
controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations: 3748 3450 3419 3748 3748 3748 3748 3748 3748 
 
Notes: Results are based on households without unemployed members. Household-level controls are included in all specifications. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table F.2. Impact of SNAP participation on dietary outcomes with alternative instruments. 
Dependent 
variable 
HEI-2010 Expenditure ($) Energy acquisition (kcal) 
 All FAH    FAFH All FAH    FAFH All FAH FAFH 
Panel A: Simulated Eligibility 1 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 
-0.608  -2.271 2.541 3.074 52.17** -49.09*** -2557.5 7183.1 -9740.6*** 
(3.244) (3.921) (2.808) (31.970) (26.598) (17.592) (9968.0
7) 
(9657.385
) 
(2315.415) 
R2 0.116 0.118 0.064 0.312 0.226 0.162 0.085 0.061 0.169 
F-statistic       168.755 160.830 149.507 168.755 168.755 168.755 168.755 168.755 168.755 
Panel B: Simulated Eligibility 2 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 
-0.0712 -2.172 3.719 20.25 58.15** -37.90** 1191.6 9613.9 -8422.3*** 
(2.876) (3.508) (2.528) (29.526) (24.553) (15.812) (8755.9
3) 
(8481.176
) 
(2056.510) 
R2 0.116 0.118 0.059 0.313 0.223 0.174 0.086 0.061 0.189 
F-statistic      189.135 176.999 165.493 189.135 189.135 189.135 189.135 189.135 189.135 
Panel C: Simulated Eligibility 3 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 
-1.344 -2.854 2.206 0.681 51.10* -50.42*** -1211.5 7983.3 -9194.8*** 
(3.415) (4.154) (3.025) (33.535) (27.659) (19.128) (10347.
56) 
(10134.69
1) 
(2202.372) 
R2 0.115 0.117 0.065 0.312 0.226 0.160 0.085 0.061 0.178 
F-statistic      152.250  147.712 134.799 152.250 152.250 152.250 152.250 152.250 152.250 
Observations: 4696 4325 4272 4696 4696 4696 4696 4696 4696 
Notes: Household-level controls are included in all specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significant 
at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. The simulated eligibilities account for state-level legislative variation and 
comprehensive household attributes. 
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Table F.3. Results using data of households below 200% Federal Poverty Line. 
Dependent variables HEI-2010 Expenditures ($) Energy acquisition (kcal) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
All FAH FAFH All FAH FAFH All FAH FAFH 
Panel A: 2SLS estimates 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 -4.404 -0.352 6.181* 7.355 47.66 -40.31* 4238.2 5910.5 -1672.3 
 (4.259) (5.047) (3.756) (39.968) (33.978) (22.790) (13998.564) (13848.517) (3477.986) 
F-statistic 33.125 31.951 34.607 33.125 33.125 33.125 33.125 33.125 33.125 
Panel B: OLS estimates 
𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃 
-0.446 -1.208** -0.129 11.57** 15.74*** -4.165* 6820.3*** 6800.1*** 20.30 
 (0.480) (0.590) (0.448) (4.772) (4.125) (2.293) (1599.235) (1582.804) (396.123) 
R2 0.140 0.137 0.086 0.219 0.190 0.096 0.285 0.217 0.259 
Household controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2602 2400 2306 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 2602 
 
Notes: The specifications in this table are the same as that in Table 2 except that we restrict the analysis to households below 200% of 
the Federal Poverty Line. 
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